Zhuang's Diary

数字货币平台具有不对称的优势（比目鱼模型，比目鱼具有扁平的身体，眼睛只生长在身体的一侧，具有鱼类中独一无二的不对称结构）
数字法币成为全球通用货币后，监管面临了新的考验。一般来说，数字法币由国家发行，由国家信用保障兑付。即使使用国际货币基金组织提出的央行－民间合作方式，数字货币仍然是一国央行和在该国注册的公司合作的金融产品，其他国家不可能拥有监管权。英国开创数字英镑的重要原因，就是要拿回监管权。如果完成数字英镑，该货币如果成为世界通用货币，其他国家会担心自己的货币金融体系受到了威胁。

因此，对这种非对称监管关系，可能会有以下几种情形出现：

（1）主权独享式：单个国家完全享有监管权，原因是这是由单个国家发行的数字法币，该国央行支持，由该国货币储备保障运行。其他国家、商家或是个人使用，都必须遵守该国法律。但作为全球货币，这种制度渗透和金融霸权模式必定受到其他国家的拒绝，Libra受到德法两国的坚决抵制就是典型的例子。同时，以德国为首的各国都开始在区块链和数字货币领域建立自己的战略部署，建立各国自有的数字法币系统，并不特别说明数字法币是潜在的全球货币，鼓励各国的商家和个人注册和交易，等到米已成粥，才将制度、监管和法律问题一并抛出。该机制以国家主权为第一优先，称为主权式。

（2）完全共享式：发行国和参与国完全共享监管权，这是另外一个极端。数字法币发行国和参与国家共享数据。但这种体系本身也有很多不平衡性，在发行基础设施方面的投入和使用量最大的都是发行国，如果所有交易让所有参与国都可以看见，安全机制和经济利益上都无法说服发行国接受，其他的参与国也可能产生异议，我们称之为完全共享式监管。

（3）部分共享式：发行国可以看到全部交易信息，而参与国只能看到和该国相关的交易信息。这样参与国可能可以接受，而发行国也可以接受。但是这样的监管机制会导致系统十分复杂。例如，该系统有100个国家参与，每个国家的监管机制一定会有各种各样的差异性，对应需要建立100套监管机制，核心运行的是一个系统，但是对应100套监管机制，系统将无法负荷这样的复杂性。要解决这个问题，需要参与国建立联盟式监管机制，建立一个“大监管机制”来包容许多国家的监管法规。但是这种“大监管机制”是否能够顺利完成，在什么条件下可以实现，这些都是数字法币发展中必须考虑的问题。这种机制事实上在美国医药区块链上已经使用，但是这样的机制不涉及主权，只涉及被监管的药。另外，如何确定交易属于哪个国家监管还是一个尚需研究的问题，监管的对象是物理地址还是网络地址仍然有待商榷。在现有网络架构下，如何解决多物理地址和多网络地址问题，并且确保在现有机制下如何保证参与国能够收到应该收到的信息，同时看不见其他国家的交易信息。但是在这种机制下，参与国有理由怀疑发行国作弊，故意不发一些重要信息。因为这一机制下的参与国都只能获得部分信息，所以我们称之为部分共享式。

（4）分层分片式：发行国和参与国都只能看到和该国相关的交易信息。这个机制的公平性大大提高，但新的问题出现了，谁是最合适的信息传输主导者？可能又回到现在SWIFT的环境，由一个中心来主导信息。发行国必定要成为自己数字法币的主导者，不太可能主动出让和分享主导权。但是如果发行国非常想要大力推行自己国家的数字法币，可能会同意该机制。因为这个机制可能会给一个国家的数字法币带来极大的边际效应，大到在其他方面做出大量让步都值得。而机制的设计对信息进行了权属分层和数据切片，使得每个国家只能看到自己的相关信息，通过权属申请可分享的信息，各国在数据分享中各行其志，规避了完全共享中涉及其他国家数据分享的问题，我们称之为分层分片式监管。这个是最靠近对称性的监管机制，但这个还不是对称性。发行方还是有更多的权力，因为系统操纵在发行方。

​ 在部分共享式和分层分片式中，都需要有一套机制来调节和决策信息的分享能力和权属程度。因为交易是高速的，也是实时结算的，相应的监管机制必须是实时的、自动化的。在西方国家，通常会成立一个委员会，由委员会来制定规则，然后交给软件系统自动处理。在区块链领域“代码就是法律”（Code is law），软件自动执行智能合约内容，因此制度的制定至关重要，委员会的会员拥有很大的权力。在数字法币委员会上，发行国在委员会占据大部分的席位，就像Libra中的初始发起会员一样。因此，发行方在整个机制运行控制上还是拥有非常大的权力。

​ 类似的问题也会出现在脸书Libra币的监管中，目前世界各国都在讨论Libra是否能纳入本国监管制度的合规体系。相比之下，一个更重要的问题是各国如何“共同”监管Libra币的运行。区块链中心思想是共识机制，但是主权监管本身是中心化决策，共识型的监管如何在各国金融体系中落地实现，将会是一个难题。

• 平台理论：数字货币需要平台才能运行，因此数字货币的竞争，也会是平台的竞争。例如电商的竞争（如阿里和京东），也是电商各自平台的竞争；传统数字代币（如比特币和以太坊）离开其平台无法运行，因此数字代币竞争也是平台竞争；若将来央行发行数字法币，也会运行在其平台上，因此如果平台有问题，那么竞争就会失去优势。比如早期一些数字法币平台计划部署在公链上，但是因为公链平台不适合数字法币的运行，因此这些计划很快就没有市场。国际货币基金组织（IMF）、英国央行、普林斯顿大学、美联储都表示数字法币会依托于平台，因此平台优越是竞争的最大优势。平台属性（例如速度、隐私、监管）将决定数字法币的功能、
  性能、安全、市场。
• 比目鱼模型：数字货币平台方具有不对称的优势（如上文），比平台参与方拥有更多信息，即使使用看似最公平的治理制度，平台方仍然拥有优势。该模型包括主权独享式（平台国家独享监管权）、完成共享式（所有参与国家都有同样的监管权）、部分共享式（参与国可以监管和自己相关的交易信息，但平台方享有全部数据）、分层共享式（所有参与国只可以看到和监管与自己相关的交易信息，但平台方享有全部数据）。即使是公平的方式（完成共享式和分层共享式），平台方还是拥有优势，因为平台方控制后台数据，而且可以使用这数据进行分析。
• 交易理论：数字货币以交易为最主要的考量，这改变了货币三大用图的平衡：交易媒介、价值储存、计量单位，通过数字货币交易，世界储备货币可以从美元换成合成霸权数字货币。该理论由普林斯顿大学提出，英国央行、欧洲央行、美联储都公开讨论并引用。

区块链架构分类：

1） “小飞象” Dumbo 模型

目前的区块链是构建在互链网之上，安全，身份，都必须由区块链自身来完成，区块链更像是互联网的一个应用，就像一个小飞象，可以飞，但是体重太重。这样的模型以后必定会有大风险，会出问题，就像将高楼建立在沙滩上，风来了，雨来了，必将倾倒。

账户存储在应用层，而不是存储在操作系统底层。央行为了监管比特币和以太坊，需要获得全部交易数据，才能达到国家监管的要求。所以，针对多个国家部署、构成全球网络的区块链，监管机制不应该放在应用层，监管机制需要放入核心层，才能够达到监管的目的。“小飞象”模型这样子的设计，监管机制很可能不能到位。

2）“操作数据库系统”Operation Database System

对所有交易进行监管，所有账户和交易信息任务需要在系统内执行，而且部分任务由硬件处理，保护隐私，增加处理速度。区块链是一个分布式数据系统，这样子的操作系统就可能成为“操作数据库系统”，不再只是操作系统。这是“可监管操作系统”的设计原则。

如上，操作系统具有两个主要进程 — 交易进程（transaction process）和监管进程（regulation process）。同时，操作系统负责追踪交易数据，交易多方各自保证各自的信息真实。如果出错，出错方需要为损失负责。

一种观点是，该“操作数据库系统”Operation Database System可以在现有操作系统上进行改造。例如，在Linux内核的基础上增加一层共识层，该层主要由文件系统加解密，网络传输加解密以及共识协议等服务组成，为上层应用提供加解密和共识协议接口。

3）互链网网络模型

在“操作数据库系统”Operation Database System等基础上，互链网成为其上的应用，互链网需要链接各式各样的链。单链网需要具备的特性：高性能；安全性和隐私性；可扩展性；容错性。

组成链网，还需要的特性：多链式架构（同构/异构）；互通性；可延伸性（用户参与）；可更改性（用户加入/退出）；可复制性（快速同步）；可管理性及非对称结构（监管节点/域名服务/控制节点/种子节点等）；层次性（高层次的链和节点具有不对称的权利）；一致性（每条链具有自己的一致性，链与链之间也要有一致性）；高可靠性；完备性（共识机制及消息来源与可靠性不同，所以各链的完备性不一样。高完备性的链可以将信息传输给低完备性的链，反之，则不可以）

身份信息处理方式分类：

1）中心化处理：由政府发证，公民使用身份证来注册，交易，上学，就医等等。

2）联邦制处理：有另外一群组织来管理身份。

3）用户管理：个人管理身份。

4）用户自主管控：自我主权身份 self- sovereign identity。

数据保护方面处理分类：

1）不存储关键数据：例如，私钥，例如Sorvin项目就采取这样子的设计，但是这种设计使得系统操作性比较差，因为系统如果需要处理信息，每次都需要对数字身份发起请求，而且在请求协议中，也可能遭到攻击。

2）存储加密信息：在系统里面，关键信息都加密，每次客户使用公钥来读、写、传递加密信息。为了一直保证安全性，系统每隔一段时间需要更换私钥。

3）系统存储明文信息：部分操作系统例如内核是可以相信的，只有内核可以出来保密信息，许多作业都由硬件处理，由硬件来保护，这是目前传统可信操作系统的设计。如intel SGX（Software Guard Extensions），ARM TrustZone等技术。

§8 COMPARISONS AND LIMITATIONS

While the range of identity frameworks proposed is almost limitless, there are four particularly prominent and adjacent paradigms widely discussed in the web3 space that merit comparison: the dominant “legacy” identity ecosystem, the pseudonymous economy, proof of personhood, and verifiable credentials. Each paradigm highlights important contributions and challenges for future development of the social identity paradigm we advocate, and we use such limitations as a springboard for exploring future directions. All that considered, we also explain why we believe our social identity primitives of Souls and soulbound tokens are a more promising path forward for privacy regimes.

虽然提出的身份框架的范围几乎是无限的，但在 web3 空间中有四个特别突出和相邻的范式被广泛讨论，值得比较：占主导地位的“传统”身份生态系统、假名经济、人格证明和可验证的凭证。每个范式都突出了我们所倡导的社会认同范式未来发展的重要贡献和挑战，我们将这些限制作为探索未来方向的跳板。考虑到所有这些，我们还解释了为什么我们相信我们的灵魂和灵魂令牌的社会身份原语是隐私制度的一条更有希望的前进道路。

8.1 Legacy

Legacy identity systems rely on pieces of papers or identity cards issued and mediated by a 3rd party (a government, university, employer, etc). Provenance is established by calling up the 3rd party for a confirmation. While the legacy system has an interesting set of properties we should understand more deeply, such systems are wildly ineffcient and do not lend themselves to composability or computation for rapid, effcient coordination. Moreover, these systems lack social context and makes Souls reliant on a centralized 3rd party to confirm membership to a community, rather than the embedding community. For example, most government issued IDs eventually trace back to a birth certificate issued on the authority of a medical doctor and family members, who are the ultimate source of truth and leave out many equally meaningful social connections that—taken together—o￾er far stronger validation. In fact, when centers of concentrated power seek strong identification (e.g., getting a security clearance from a major government) they rarely rely on such documents, instead turning to interviews in social networks. Thus such legacy identity systems tend to concentrate power in the issuer and in those who can undertake the due diligence to get stronger verification, who in turn become calci￾ed and unreliable bureaucracies. A crucial design goal of DeSoc is ensuring that the security requirements of government IDs can be met and exceeded, allowing horizontal networks to make greater security available to all users and through a range of social substrates.

传统身份系统依赖于由第三方（政府、大学、雇主等）发行和调解的文件或身份证。通过致电第三方进行确认来确定出处。虽然遗留系统具有我们应该更深入地理解的一组有趣的属性，但这些系统效率极低，并且不适合用于快速、有效协调的可组合性或计算。此外，这些系统缺乏社会背景，使得 Souls 依赖于一个集中的第三方来确认社区的成员身份，而不是嵌入社区。例如，大多数政府颁发的身份证最终都可以追溯到由医生和家庭成员授权签发的出生证明，他们是真相的最终来源，并且遗漏了许多同样有意义的社会联系——加在一起——远远超过更强的验证。事实上，当权力集中的中心寻求强有力的身份证明（例如，获得主要政府的安全许可）时，他们很少依赖此类文件，而是转向社交网络中的采访。因此，此类遗留身份系统倾向于将权力集中在发行者和那些能够进行尽职调查以获得更强大验证的人身上，而这些人反过来又会成为刻板和不可靠的官僚机构。DeSoc 的一个关键设计目标是确保能够满足和超过政府 ID 的安全要求，允许横向网络通过一系列社交基础为所有用户提供更高的安全性。

8.2 Pseudonymous Economy

The vision of a society based around combining reputation systems with zero knowledge proof mechanisms to preserve privacy has been most widely promoted by Balaji Srinivasan, who coined and popularized the phrase “pseudonymous economy.” His early version emphasizes the use of pseudonyms to avoid discrimination and evade “cancel culture” by social mobs that seek to harm a person’s reputation and break their social ties. It envisions people accumulating transferable zero-knowledge (ZK) attestations in their wallets and evading reputational attacks by transferring a subset of attestations to new wallets, or splitting the attestations amongst multiple wallets, presumably without traceability. In culling attestations to port, a person chooses the level of desired pseudonymity in the new account, weighing a tradeoff between more anonymity (porting fewer attestations) or more distribution to their social network (porting over more attestations).

The practical difference between typical pseudonymous economy proposals and DeSoc is that we deemphasize identity separation as a primary way to protect participants from abuses and cancel culture. Some level of separation (e.g., different Souls between family, work, politics, etc.) may be healthy, but in general there are great disadvantages to relying on the ability to spin up new identities as a primary crutch against attacks. It makes reputation-staking for lending and provenance harder, and it composes poorly with governance mechanisms that try to correct for correlations or Sybils.

Rather than protecting victims by allowing them to re-emerge from attacks with a new–if diminished—identity, DeSoc would allow other approaches, such as contextualizing the attacker. “Cancellation” often arises precisely because statements and actions are taken out of context and viral signals travel through uncontextualized networks, when a person or bot has little social connection or context to a victim. In the same way that SBTs provide provenance to protect against deep fakes, a map of SBTs socially graphs a “hit piece’s” origin. “Hit pieces” essentially are artifacts arising outside of the victim’s communities (as reflected by shared SBT memberships), or lacking SBT attestations from the victim’s communities—which should cast doubt on the piece’s veracity. SBTs also empower victims to launch a defensive response to counteract the hit, curated and propagated from their network of trust (represented here by the patterns of co-holding of SBTs). By maintaining social context, people can maintain trust, even if they are under threat of cancellation, and hold attackers accountable. Improving provenance improves the social foundation of truth.

8.2 假名经济

Balaji Srinivasan 最广泛地推动了基于将声誉系统与零知识证明机制相结合以保护隐私的社会愿景，他创造并推广了“假名经济”一词。他的早期版本强调使用假名来避免社会暴徒的歧视和“取消文化”，这些暴徒试图损害一个人的声誉并打破他们的社会联系。它设想人们在他们的钱包中积累可转移的零知识 (ZK) 证明，并通过将证明子集转移到新钱包或将证明拆分到多个钱包中来逃避声誉攻击，这可能是没有可追溯性的。在挑选要移植的证明时，一个人选择新帐户中所需的假名级别，权衡更多匿名性（移植较少的证明）或更多分布到他们的社交网络（移植更多的证明）之间的权衡。

典型的匿名经济提案和 DeSoc 之间的实际区别在于，我们不再强调身份分离是保护参与者免受滥用和取消文化的主要方式。某种程度的分离（例如，家庭、工作、政治等之间的不同灵魂）可能是健康的，但一般来说，依靠建立新身份的能力作为抵御攻击的主要拐杖存在很大的缺点。它使贷款和出处的声誉赌注变得更加困难，并且它与试图纠正相关性或 Sybils 的治理机制的组合很差。

DeSoc 不会通过允许受害者以新的身份（如果已减少）重新出现在攻击中来保护受害者，而是允许其他方法，例如将攻击者情境化。 “取消”经常出现，因为当一个人或机器人与受害者几乎没有社交联系或背景时，声明和行动是脱离上下文并且病毒信号通过非上下文网络传播的。与 SBT 提供出处以防止深度伪造的方式相同，SBT 的地图在社交上绘制了“热门作品”的起源。 “热门片段”本质上是在受害者社区之外产生的人工制品（如共享的 SBT 成员资格所反映），或者缺乏来自受害者社区的 SBT 证明——这应该会让人怀疑该作品的真实性。 SBT 还使受害者能够发起防御性反应，以抵消从他们的信任网络中策划和传播的打击（此处以共同持有 SBT 的模式为代表）。通过维护社会背景，人们可以保持信任，即使他们面临取消的威胁，并追究攻击者的责任。改善出处可以改善真理的社会基础。

8.3 Proof of personhood (PoP)

Proof of Personhood protocols (PoP) aim to provide tokens of individual uniqueness, to prevent Sybil attacks and allow non-financialized applications. To do so, they rely on approaches such as global analysis of social graphs, biometrics, simultaneous global key parties, or some combination thereof. However, because PoP protocols seek to represent individual identities—focused on achieving global uniqueness—rather than social identities mapping relationships and solidarities, PoP protocols are limited to applications that treat all humans the same. Most applications we are interested in—such as staking reputation—are relational and move beyond being a unique human to being a differentiated human.

Moreover, PoP protocols are not immune to sybil attacks. In almost all near-term foreseeable applications, PoP systems are effectively open to Sybil attacks, just at a slightly higher cost. Unless most people on the planet are registered for a PoP service and are participating in a particular validation exercise, an attacker can always recruit disinterested humans who are not yet participating to act as Sybils. While such mercenaries are not quite bots, the difference is superficial other than perhaps a small added expense.

Many PoP protocols aim to build a substrate for universal basic income or global democracy. While we don’t share the same ambition, such protocols have spurred us to nonetheless consider how to build gradually towards coordinating plural network goods. In contrast to the binary, individualist and global nature of PoP, our approach aims to construct a rich, contextual and layered substrate for bottom-up reputation, property and governance that allows participation in a range of communities and networks, small and large.

8.3 人格证明（PoP）

人格证明协议 (PoP) 旨在提供个人唯一性的代币，以防止 Sybil 攻击并允许非金融化应用程序。为此，他们依赖于社交图谱的全局分析、生物识别、同步的全球关键方或它们的某种组合等方法。然而，由于 PoP 协议寻求代表个人身份——专注于实现全球唯一性——而不是映射关系和团结的社会身份，所以 PoP 协议仅限于对所有人一视同仁的应用程序。我们感兴趣的大多数应用程序（例如质押声誉）都是相关的，并且超越了成为一个独特的人，成为一个与众不同的人。

此外，PoP 协议也不能免受女巫攻击。在几乎所有近期可预见的应用中，PoP 系统都有效地对 Sybil 攻击开放，只是成本略高。除非地球上的大多数人都注册了 PoP 服务并且正在参与特定的验证活动，否则攻击者总是可以招募尚未参与的不感兴趣的人充当 Sybils。虽然这样的雇佣兵并不完全是机器人，但区别只是表面的，可能只是增加了一点点费用。

许多 PoP 协议旨在为普遍基本收入或全球民主建立基础。虽然我们的野心不同，但此类协议仍促使我们考虑如何逐步构建以协调多种网络产品。与 PoP 的二元、个人主义和全球性质相比，我们的方法旨在为自下而上的声誉、财产和治理构建一个丰富的、上下文相关的和分层的基础，允许参与各种大小的社区和网络。

8.4 Verifiable credentials

Verifiable credentials (VCs) are a W3C standard where credentials (or attestations) are zk-shareable at the holder’s discretion. VCs highlight the major limitations of our baseline privacy paradigm and motivate our discussion of privacy extensions above. Until SBTs have privacy extensions that narrow publicity, VCs and SBTs can be seen as natural complements: in particular, SBTs are initially public making them inappropriate for sensitive information like government-issued identification, while VC implementations have struggled with a recovery paradigm that could be addressed by community recovery. The two approaches combined can in the near-term be stronger than either alone. But VCs also have a key limitation: at least in their standardized form, VCs do not support most of the applications we have enumerated because of their unilateral privacy.

Unilateral zk-sharing isn’t incentive-compatible with our use cases, nor does it reflect our norms around privacy. Most of our applications depend on some level of publicity. But under zk-sharing, Souls can’t know another Soul possesses an SBT unless it is shared to them—making reputation-staking, redible commitments, sybil-resistant governance, and simple rental contracts (e.g., apartment lease) impossible to get off the ground as other commitments and encumbrances are not necessarily visible. More deeply, we are skeptical that unilateral shareability is usually the right privacy paradigm. Rarely does one party in a multi-party relationship have the unilateral rights to disclose the relationship without the consent of the other. Just as unilaterally transferable private property is not a rich property regime, simplistic unilateral shareability is not a very rich privacy regime. If two parties co-own an asset and choose to represent their relationship through a VC, such credential doesn’t allow for the mutual-consent and mutual-permissions. This problem travels to more complex cases of plural property and complex organizational forms and permissions, which are a feature of DeSoc.

8.4 可验证的凭据

可验证凭证 (VC) 是 W3C 标准，其中凭证（或证明）由持有者自行决定是 zk-shareable。VC 强调了我们基线隐私范式的主要局限性，并激发了我们对上述隐私扩展的讨论。在 SBT 具有缩小宣传范围的隐私扩展之前，VC 和 SBT 可以被视为自然的补充：特别是，SBT 最初是公开的，因此它们不适用于政府颁发的身份证明等敏感信息，而 VC 的实施一直在努力应对一种恢复范式，这可能是由社区恢复解决。在短期内，这两种方法结合起来可能比单独使用任何一种方法都更强大。但是 VC 也有一个关键的限制：至少在它们的标准化形式上，VC 不支持我们列举的大多数应用程序，因为它们具有单方面的隐私性。

单边零知识共享与我们的用例不兼容激励，也不反映我们关于隐私的规范。我们的大多数应用程序都依赖于某种程度的宣传。但是在 zk-sharing 下，Souls 无法知道另一个 Soul 拥有 SBT，除非它被共享给他们——这使得声誉赌注、redible 承诺、抗女巫治理和简单的租赁合同（例如，公寓租赁）无法脱身其他承诺和产权负担不一定是可见的。更深入地说，我们怀疑单方面的可共享性通常是正确的隐私范式。多方关系中的一方很少有未经另一方同意而单方面披露关系的权利。正如单方面可转让的私有财产不是丰富的财产制度一样，简单的单方面可共享性也不是非常丰富的隐私制度。如果两方共同拥有一项资产并选择通过 VC 代表他们的关系，则这种凭证不允许相互同意和相互许可。这个问题涉及到更复杂的复数财产和复杂的组织形式和权限的情况，这是 DeSoc 的一个特点。

§9 SOUL BIRTH

The path from the current web3 ecosystem to augmented sociality mediated by SBTs faces a classic cold start challenge. On the one hand, SBTs are not transferable. On the other hand, today’s mix of wallets may not be the final home for SBTs because they lack community recovery mechanisms. But in order for community recovery wallets to work, they need a rich variety of SBTs across discrete communities to be secure. What comes first: SBTs or community recovery? Who are the early adopter communities? How do SBTs on different chains interoperate? We cannot aspire to know all the possibilities and answers, but instead sketch a few promising paths for the reader to further explore within the current web3 and even web2 architecture.

从当前的 web3 生态系统到由 SBT 介导的增强社交的路径面临着典型的冷启动挑战。一方面，SBT 不可转让。另一方面，今天的钱包组合可能不是 SBT 的最终归宿，因为它们缺乏社区恢复机制。但为了让社区恢复钱包发挥作用，他们需要跨不同社区的各种 SBT 来保证安全。首先是什么：SBT 还是社区恢复？ 谁是早期采用者社区？不同链上的 SBT 如何互操作？ 我们不能渴望知道所有的可能性和答案，而是勾勒出一些有希望的路径供读者在当前的 web3 甚至 web2 架构中进一步探索。

9.1 Proto SBTs

Although the hallmark of SBTs is non-transferability, SBTs may also have another property which may prove more useful in bootstrapping: revocability. It’s possible that SBTs first gestate as revocable, transferable tokens, before growing into non-transferability. A token is revocable if an issuer can burn the token and re-issue it to a new wallet. Burning and re-issuing would make sense when, for example, keys are lost or compromised, and the issuer has an interest in ensuring the tokens are not financialized and sold off to a party—in other words, when the token signals authentic community membership. Employers, churches, meet-up groups, clubs with repeat off-chain interactions are well positioned to burn and re-issue tokens because they have a relationship with a person, and can easily check for impersonation by phone call, video-conference, or simple meeting in person. Single interactions, such as attendance to a concert or conference are poorly suited because community bonds are weaker.

Revocable, transferable tokens are a kind of proto-SBT—serving supportive, placental functions before Soul birth. These tokens buy time both for wallets to gestate secure, community recovery mechanisms and for a person to su￾ciently accumulate proto-SBTs that can eventually be burned and re-issued into non-transferable SBTs. Under this pathway, the question is not, “what happens first: SBTs or community recovery?” Rather, SBTs and community recovery instantiate simultaneously, birthing a Soul.

9.1 原型 SBT

尽管 SBT 的标志是不可转让性，但 SBT 可能还具有另一个可能被证明在引导中更有用的属性：可撤销性。SBT 有可能首先孕育为可撤销、可转让的代币，然后才发展为不可转让。如果发行者可以销毁令牌并将其重新发行到新钱包，则令牌是可撤销的。例如，当密钥丢失或泄露时，燃烧和重新发行是有意义的，并且发行人有兴趣确保代币不会被金融化并出售给一方——换句话说，当代币表明真正的社区成员身份时，具有重复链下互动的雇主、教堂、聚会团体、俱乐部很容易销毁和重新发行代币，因为它们与人有关系，并且可以通过电话、视频会议或简单的面对面会议。单一的互动，例如参加音乐会或会议，不太适合，因为社区纽带较弱。

可撤销、可转让的代币是一种原型 SBT——在灵魂出生之前提供支持性的胎盘功能。这些代币为钱包争取时间来孕育安全的社区恢复机制，以及让人们充分积累最终可以被烧毁并重新发行为不可转让的 SBT 的原始 SBT。在这条路径下，问题不是“首先发生什么：SBT 还是社区恢复？”相反，SBT 和社区恢复同时实例化，产生了一个灵魂。

9.2 Community Recovery Wallets

Although today’s wallets lack community recovery, they each have relative strengths and weaknesses in being homes—or perhaps gestational wombs—for SBTs. Proof of Personhood (PoP) protocols have the advantage of already experimenting with social dispute resolution mechanisms, which are the foundation of community recovery. Also, many DAOs use PoPs to facilitate governance, making them natural first issuers of SBTs. However, despite PoPs natural lead, PoP protocols haven’t yet earned broad trust to house valuable token assets, whereas custodial wallets have.

Custodial wallets—despite their flaws of centralization—may thus offer a natural onramp for less sophisticated retail users. Such custodial wallets could also build tooling for retail communities to issue revocable tokens that later convert (or burn and reissue) into SBTs or even tooling for more “corporate” issuers—many of whom are looking for ways to build loyal customer bases in web3 but lack expertise in custody. Once community recovery mechanisms have been formalized and battle-tested, these custodial wallets could decentralize into community recovery, while custodians move on to providing other valuable services in DeSoc (like community management, SBTs issuances, etc.)

For more sophisticated web3 users, decentralized non-custodial wallets (or non-custodial social recovery wallets like Argent and Loopring) are a natural starting point for bootstrapping community recovery mechanisms. Non-custodial wallets have the advantage of being native web3 open-source, and the flexibility to pre-announce and experiment with mechanisms incrementally to a subset of voluntary, sophisticated users to battletest incentives and mix mechanisms (e.g.,mult-sig). All of these approaches—PoPs, custodial, and non-custodial—play an important role in experimenting and onboarding users with different degrees of sophistication and risk tolerance.

9.2 社区恢复钱包

尽管今天的钱包缺乏社区恢复能力，但它们在成为 SBT 的家——或者可能是妊娠子宫——方面都有相对的优势和劣势。人格证明 (PoP) 协议的优势在于已经在尝试社会争议解决机制，这是社区恢复的基础。此外，许多 DAO 使用 PoP 来促进治理，使其自然成为 SBT 的第一发行者。然而，尽管 PoP 自然领先，但 PoP 协议尚未赢得广泛信任来存放有价值的代币资产，而托管钱包则有。

托管钱包——尽管存在中心化缺陷——可能因此为不太成熟的零售用户提供了一个自然的入口。此类托管钱包还可以为零售社区构建工具，以发行可撤销的代币，这些代币随后会转换（或销毁和重新发行）为 SBT，甚至可以为更多“企业”发行人提供工具——其中许多人正在寻找在 web3 中建立忠诚客户群的方法，但缺乏监管方面的专业知识。一旦社区恢复机制正式确定并经过实战考验，这些托管钱包可以分散到社区恢复中，而托管人则继续在 DeSoc 中提供其他有价值的服务（如社区管理、SBT 发行等）

对于更成熟的 web3 用户，去中心化的非托管钱包（或像 Argent 和 Loopring 这样的非托管社交恢复钱包）是引导社区恢复机制的自然起点。非托管钱包具有原生 web3 开源的优势，并且可以灵活地预先宣布和逐步试验机制，让一部分自愿的、成熟的用户对激励和混合机制（例如多重签名）进行战斗测试。所有这些方法（PoP、托管和非托管）在试验和引导具有不同复杂程度和风险承受能力的用户方面发挥着重要作用。

9.3 Proto-Souls

Norms can also shepherd Souls into existence. As we rethink tokens and wallets, we can also reframe how we think about certain classes of NFTs and tokens that are intended to signal membership. In particular, we can introduce a norm of not transferring NFTs and POAPs issued by reputable institutions that reflect attendance to a conference, work experience, or education credentials. Such transfers of membership tokens—if traded for value—could diminish the reputation of a wallet and perhaps discourage issuers from further issuing membership or POAP tokens to that wallet. Already in the non-custodial ecosystem, a significant number of users have achieved significant financial reputation and stake in their wallets, which could bootstrap as effective collateral for them not to abuse non-transferability expectations.

While all these pathways have respective challenges, we hope that the variety of approaches increases the chance of convergence to our quasi-equilibrium state in the medium term through a small set of steps.

9.3 原始灵魂

规范也可以引导灵魂存在。当我们重新考虑代币和钱包时，我们还可以重新定义我们对某些类别的 NFT 和旨在表明会员资格的代币的看法。特别是，我们可以引入不转让由知名机构颁发的反映会议出席情况、工作经验或教育证书的 NFT 和 POAP 的规范。这种会员代币的转移——如果进行价值交易——可能会降低钱包的声誉，并可能阻止发行人进一步向该钱包发行会员或 POAP 代币。已经在非托管生态系统中，大量用户已经获得了显着的财务声誉和钱包中的股份，这可以作为有效的抵押品，让他们不滥用不可转让性期望。

虽然所有这些途径都有各自的挑战，但我们希望各种方法能够通过一小部分步骤增加在中期收敛到我们的准平衡状态的机会。

§10 CONCLUSION

As ambitious as we have been in imagining what DeSoc could enable, in many ways the above are just first steps. There is more than one road to DeSoc, including a number of non-blockchain based frameworks, such as Spritely, ACDC and Backchannel that rely on data stores tied to local machines rather than global ledgers. These frameworks may eventually o￾er even greater trust across social distance, because they can harness transitivity of trust relationships—like trusted introductions—rather than relying on SBTs issued by well-known, high-status institutions (like universities or DAOs). Furthermore the applications we describe above are just the beginning of what DeSoc can empower, not touching virtual worlds: their physics, society, and their complex intersection with the physical world. All this suggests that even the broad ambitions we paint above are just the beginning of what DeSoc may eventually become.

On that path, however, many challenges and open questions remain. The above sketches require extensive red teaming and many of them are more suggestive than fully prescriptive. How can DAOs maintain their publicity of state while thoughtfully comparing patterns of Souls and correlations in SBTs to enforce Sybil protections and decentralization? How incentive compatible is acquiring SBTs in face of various schemes of correlation discounting? How much does privacy conflict with correlation discounting and other DeSoc mechanism designs? How can we measure inequality in a social and yet appropriately private (contextually integral) manner? How should inheritance work in the community recovery framework? Are there red lines that can be drawn or even baked into protocols to avoid dystopian scenarios? Or should we simply race to build the best scenarios first? These questions are just the beginning of what we expect to be a research agenda spanning years that will co-evolve with the DeSoc ecosystem.

Yet the potential that DeSoc offers seems not just worth the price of navigating these tricky challenges, but perhaps necessary to ensure our survival. Albert Einstein told the 1932 disarmament conference that the failures of the “organizing power of man” to keep pace with “his technical advances” had put a “razor in the hands of a 3-year-old child.” In a world where his observation seems more prescient than ever, learning how to program futures that encode sociality—rather than writing over trust—seems a required course for human life on this planet to persist.

尽管我们一直在想象 DeSoc 可以实现什么，但在许多方面，上述只是第一步。通往 DeSoc 的道路不止一条，包括许多基于非区块链的框架，例如 Spritely、ACDC 和 Backchannel，它们依赖于与本地机器而不是全局分类帐相关的数据存储。这些框架最终可能会在社交距离上提供更大的信任，因为它们可以利用信任关系的传递性——比如受信任的介绍——而不是依赖于知名的高地位机构（如大学或 DAO）发布的 SBT。此外，我们上面描述的应用程序只是 DeSoc 能够增强能力的开始，而不涉及虚拟世界：它们的物理、社会以及它们与物理世界的复杂交集。所有这些都表明，即使是我们在上面描绘的广泛野心，也只是 DeSoc 最终可能成为的开始。

然而，在这条道路上，仍然存在许多挑战和悬而未决的问题。上述草图需要大量的红队，其中许多比完全规范更具暗示性。DAO 如何在仔细比较 SBT 中的灵魂模式和相关性以执行 Sybil 保护和去中心化的同时保持其状态宣传？面对各种相关贴现方案，获得 SBT 的激励兼容性如何？隐私与相关折扣和其他 DeSoc 机制设计有多少冲突？我们如何以一种社会性的但又适当的私人（语境整合）方式来衡量不平等？继承在社区恢复框架中应该如何工作？是否有可以绘制甚至纳入协议的红线以避免反乌托邦情景？还是我们应该首先竞相构建最佳场景？这些问题只是我们期望的跨年研究议程的开始，该议程将与 DeSoc 生态系统共同发展。

然而，DeSoc 提供的潜力似乎不仅值得为应对这些棘手的挑战付出代价，而且可能是确保我们生存所必需的。阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦在 1932 年的裁军会议上说，“人的组织能力”未能跟上“他的技术进步”的步伐，这让“一个 3 岁的孩子手里拿着一把剃刀”。在一个他的观察似乎比以往任何时候都更有先见之明的世界里，学习如何编程编码社会性的未来——而不是写在信任之上——似乎是人类在这个星球上生存下去的必修课。

§6 DECENTRALIZED SOCIETY

Web3 aspires to transform societies broadly, rather than merely financial systems. Yet today’s social fabric—families, churches, teams, companies, civil society, celebrity, democracy—is meaningless in virtual worlds (often called the “metaverse”) without primitives representing human souls and the broader relationships they support. If web3 eschews persistent identities, their patterns of trust and cooperation, and their composable rights and permissions, we see, respectively, sybil attacks, collusion, and a limited economic realm of wholly transferable private property—all of which trends towards hyper-financialization.

To skirt hyper-financialization—yet unlock exponential growth—we propose augmenting and bridging our sociality across virtual and physical realities, empowering souls and communities to encode rich social and economic relationships. But simply building on trust and cooperation is not enough. Correcting for biases and tendencies to over-coordinate (or collude) among trust networks is essential to encouraging more intricate, diverse relationships that span greater social distances than before. We call this “Decentralized Society (DeSoc)”: a co-determined sociality, where Souls and Communities convene bottom-up, as emergent properties of each other to produce plural network goods across different scales.

We emphasize plural network goods as a feature of DeSoc, because networks are the most powerful engine of economic growth, yet the most susceptible to dystopian capture by private actors (e.g., web2) and powerful governments (e.g., Chinese Communist Party). Most significant economic growth results from increasing network returns, where every additional unit of input yields incrementally more output. Examples of simple physical networks include roads, electrical grids, cities, and other forms of infrastructure built off labor and other capital inputs. Examples of powerful digital networks include marketplaces, predictive models and plural intelligences built o￾ data. In both cases, network economics diverges from neoclassical economics, which teaches decreasing returns—where every additional unit of input yields incrementally less output—and where private property yields the most efficient outcomes. Private property applied to an increasing returns context has the opposite effect—throttling network growth by rent extraction. A road between two cities can unlock increasing returns from gains from trade. But the same road privately owned can throttle growth if the owners choose to extract rent up to the value trading between the two cities. Public ownership over a network also has its own perils, being susceptible to regulatory capture or underfunding.

Networks with increasing returns are most efficient when treated neither as purely public nor purely private goods, but rather as partial and plural shared goods. DeSoc provides the social substrate to unbundle and reconfigure rights—rights of use (“usus”), rights to consume or destroy (“abusus”), and rights of profit (“fructus”)—and enable efficient governance mechanisms across these rights that augment trust and cooperation while checking for collusion and capture. We’ve explored several mechanisms throughout this paper, such as community-based SALSA and quadratic funding (and voting) discounted by correlation scores. This third way of partial and plural ownership avoids the Charybdis of private rent extraction and Scylla of public regulatory capture.

Web3 渴望广泛地改变社会，而不仅仅是金融系统。然而，今天的社会结构——家庭、教堂、团队、公司、公民社会、名人、民主——在没有代表人类灵魂的原始人和他们所支持的更广泛关系的虚拟世界（通常称为“元界”）中毫无意义。如果 web3 避开持久性身份、信任和合作模式以及可组合的权利和许可，我们将分别看到女巫攻击、勾结和完全可转让的私有财产的有限经济领域——所有这些都趋向于超金融化。

为了避免过度金融化——同时释放指数级增长——我们建议在虚拟和物理现实中增强和连接我们的社交性，赋予灵魂和社区以编码丰富的社会和经济关系的能力。但仅仅建立在信任与合作之上是不够的。纠正信任网络之间的偏见和过度协调（或勾结）的倾向对于鼓励比以前跨越更大社会距离的更复杂、更多样化的关系至关重要。我们称之为“去中心化社会（DeSoc）”：一种共同决定的社会性，灵魂和社区自下而上地聚集在一起，作为彼此的新兴属性，以生产不同规模的多种网络商品。

我们强调多元网络商品是 DeSoc 的一个特征，因为网络是经济增长最强大的引擎，但最容易被私人参与者（例如 web2）和强大的政府（例如中国共产党）所俘获。最显着的经济增长来自网络回报的增加，其中每增加一个输入单位就会产生更多的输出。简单的物理网络的例子包括道路、电网、城市和其他形式的基础设施，这些基础设施是建立在劳动力和其他资本投入之上的。强大的数字网络的例子包括市场、预测模型和基于数据的多元智能。在这两种情况下，网络经济学都不同于新古典经济学，后者教导收益递减——每增加一个单位的投入产生的产出就会逐渐减少——而私有财产产生最有效的结果。在收益递增的情况下，私有财产会产生相反的效果——通过提取租金来抑制网络增长。两座城市之间的道路可以从贸易收益中获得越来越多的回报。但如果业主选择将租金提高到两个城市之间的价值交易，同一条私人拥有的道路可能会抑制增长。网络的公共所有权也有其自身的风险，容易受到监管或资金不足的影响。

当既不将其视为纯粹的公共物品或纯粹的私人物品，而是将其视为部分和复数的共享物品时，回报递增的网络效率最高。DeSoc 为分解和重新配置权利提供了社会基础——使用权（“usus”）、消费或破坏权（“abusus”）和利润权（“fructus”）——并在这些权利中启用有效的治理机制， 在检查合谋和俘虏的同时增强信任和合作。 我们在本文中探索了几种机制，例如基于社区的 SALSA 和相关分数打折的二次融资（和投票）。 第三种部分和复数所有权避免了私人租金提取的 Charybdis 和公共监管捕获的 Scylla。

In many ways, DeFi today is a decreasing returns private property paradigm retro￾tted onto increasing returns networks. Built on the premise of trustlessness, DeFi is inherently limited to the realm of wholly transferable private property (e.g., transferable tokens) that mostly bundles “usus,” “abusus,” and “fructus.” At best, DeFi risks throttling network growth by rent extraction and at worst risks ushering in dystopian surveillance monopolies dominated by “whales’’ who harvest and hoover up data in a race-to-the-bottom—much like web2.

DeSoc transforms DeFi’s race to control and speculate on the value of networks into a bottom-up coordination to build, participate, and govern them. At minimum, DeSoc’s social substrate can make DeFisybil-resistant (enabling community governance), vampire-resistant (internalizing positive externalities to build an open-source network), and collusion-resistant (preserving a network’s decentralization). With DeSoc’s structural corrections, DeFi can support and expand plural networks that confer benefits broadly—as agreed upon by the most diverse members—rather than further entrenching networks captured by narrow interests.

Yet, the greatest strength of DeSoc is its network composability. Sustained increasing returns and network growth isn’t simply avoiding the perils of rent extraction, but also encouraging the proliferation and intersection of nested networks. A road may form a network between two cities. But cut off from broader cooperation, two cooperating cities will eventually hit a ceiling of diminishing returns—either because of congestion (roads and housing) or exhaustion (reaching the limits of the people they can serve). Only through technological innovation and growing broader, if looser, cooperation with neighboring networks for new sources of increasing returns can value continue to grow exponentially. Some cooperation will be physical, incrementally extending physical trade across space. But many more connections will be informational and digital. Over time, we will see new matrices of cooperation between physical and digital networks, reliant upon and extending the social interconnections they are built on. It is precisely this intersecting, partly nested structure of ever growing network cooperation across digital and physical worlds that DeSoc enables.

Through composing networks and coordination, DeSoc emerges at the intersection of politics and markets—augmenting both with sociality. DeSoc empowers the vision of JCR Licklider—founder of ARPANET that created the internet—of “man-computer symbiosis” in an “intergalactic computer network” with dramatically increased social dynamism built on trust. Rather than build on DeFi’s trustless premise, DeSoc encodes trust networks that underpin the real economy today and enables us to harness them to generate plural network goods resilient to capture, extraction, or domination. With such augmented sociality, web3 can eschew short-term hyper-financialization in favor of an unbounded future of increasing returns across social distance.

在许多方面，今天的 DeFi 是一种收益递减的私有财产范式，被改造成收益递增的网络。DeFi 建立在无需信任的前提下，本质上仅限于完全可转让的私有财产（例如可转让代币）领域，主要捆绑了 “usus”、 “abusus” 和 “fructus”。充其量，DeFi 有可能通过提取租金来限制网络增长，而在最坏的情况下，有可能迎来由“鲸鱼”主导的反乌托邦监视垄断，这些鲸鱼在竞相下收集和吸食数据——就像 web2 一样。

DeSoc 将 DeFi 控制和推测网络价值的竞赛转变为自下而上的协调，以构建、参与和管理它们。至少，DeSoc 的社会基础可以使 DeFisybil 抗性（支持社区治理）、吸血鬼抗性（内化正外部性以构建开源网络）和抗共谋（保持网络的去中心化）。通过 DeSoc 的结构修正，DeFi 可以支持和扩展多元化的网络，这些网络可以广泛地赋予利益——正如最多样化的成员所同意的那样——而不是进一步巩固被狭隘利益集团俘获的网络。

然而，DeSoc 的最大优势在于其网络可组合性。持续递增的回报和网络增长不仅避免了租金提取的危险，而且还鼓励嵌套网络的扩散和交叉。一条道路可以形成两个城市之间的网络。但如果切断更广泛的合作，两个合作的城市最终将达到收益递减的上限——要么是因为拥堵（道路和住房），要么是因为疲惫（达到了他们可以服务的人群的极限）。只有通过技术创新和更广泛（如果更松散）与邻近网络合作以获得新的收益增加来源，价值才能继续呈指数级增长。一些合作将是实体的，逐步扩展跨空间的实体贸易。但更多的连接将是信息化和数字化的。随着时间的推移，我们将看到物理和数字网络之间的新合作矩阵，依赖并扩展它们所建立的社会互连。正是这种交叉、部分嵌套的跨数字和物理世界不断增长的网络合作结构正是 DeSoc 实现的。

通过组成网络和协调，DeSoc 出现在政治和市场的交汇处——同时增强了社会性。 DeSoc 赋予了 JCR Licklider （创造互联网的 ARPANET 的创始人）在“星际计算机网络”中“人机共生”的愿景，并在信任的基础上显着增强了社会活力。DeSoc 不是建立在 DeFi 的去信任前提之上，而是对支撑当今实体经济的信任网络进行编码，并使我们能够利用它们来生成多种网络商品，以适应捕获、提取或支配。借助这种增强的社交性，web3 可以避免短期的超金融化，转而支持跨越社交距离的无限未来增加回报。

§7 IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES

Privacy presents a key challenge for DeSoc. On the one hand, too many public SBTs may reveal too much information about a Soul, making them vulnerable to social control. On the other hand, too many purely private SBTs may also lead to private communication channels that eschew correlation discounting for governance and social coordination—presenting important incentive compatibility questions. Closely related to the issue of privacy is the issue of cheating: Souls may misrepresent their social solidarities, while coordinating through private or side channels. We cannot aspire to know all the possibilities and answers, but instead explore the nature of the challenge here and sketch a few promising paths for future research.

隐私对 DeSoc 来说是一个关键挑战。一方面，太多的公共 SBT 可能会泄露太多关于灵魂的信息，使他们容易受到社会控制。另一方面，过多的纯私人 SBT 也可能导致私人沟通渠道避开治理和社会协调的相关性折扣——这提出了重要的激励相容性问题。与隐私问题密切相关的是欺骗问题：灵魂可能会歪曲他们的社会团结，同时通过私人或辅助渠道进行协调。我们不能渴望知道所有的可能性和答案，而是在这里探索挑战的本质，并为未来的研究勾勒出一些有希望的路径。

7.1 Private Souls

Blockchain-based systems are public by default. Any relationship that is recorded on-chain is immediately visible not just to the participants, but also to anyone in the entire world. Some privacy can be retained by having multiple pseudonyms: a family Soul, a medical Soul, a professional Soul, a political Soul each carrying different SBTs. But done naively, it could be very easy to correlate these Souls to each other. The consequences of this lack of privacy are serious. Indeed, without explicit measures taken to protect privacy, the “naive” vision of simply putting all SBTs on-chain may well make too much information public for many applications.

To deal with over-publicity, there are a number of solutions with different levels of technical complexity and functionality. The simplest approach is that an SBT could store data on-chain.

基于区块链的系统默认是公开的。 记录在链上的任何关系不仅对参与者，而且对全世界的任何人都是立即可见的。使用多个假名可以保留一些隐私：家庭灵魂、医疗灵魂、专业灵魂、政治灵魂，每个都携带不同的 SBT。但是如果天真地完成，很容易将这些灵魂相互关联起来。 这种缺乏隐私的后果是严重的。事实上，如果没有采取明确的措施来保护隐私，简单地将所有 SBT 上链的“幼稚”愿景很可能会使许多应用程序公开太多信息。

为了应对过度宣传，有许多具有不同技术复杂性和功能级别的解决方案。 最简单的方法是 SBT 可以在链上存储数据。


The choice of how to store the o￾-chain data is left to the person; possible solutions include (i) their own devices, (ii) a cloud service trusted by them, or (iii) decentralized networks such as the Interplanetary File System (IPFS). Storing data off-chain lets us continue to have smart contracts that permission the right to write SBT data, but at the same time have separate permissions to read that data. Bob can choose to reveal the contents of any of his SBTs (or the data stores which they permission) only when he wishes to. This already gets us quite far, and has the further benefit of improving technical scalability because most data only needs to be handled by a very small number of parties. But to fully achieve properties like plural privacy, as well as more fine-grained forms of disclosure, we need to go further. Fortunately, many cryptographic technologies let us do that.

One powerful set of building blocks that enables new ways to partially reveal data is a branch of cryptography called “zero knowledge proofs.” While zero knowledge proofs are most frequently used today to enable privacy-preserving transfers of assets, they also can allow people to prove arbitrary statements without revealing any more information beyond the statement itself. For example, in a world where government documents and other attestations are cryptographically provable, someone could prove a statement like “I am a citizen of Canada, who is over 18 years old and has a university degree in economics and over 50,000 Twitter followers, and who has not yet claimed an account in this system.”

Zero-knowledge proofs can be computed over SBTs to prove characteristics about a Soul (e.g., that it has certain memberships). This technique can be extended further by introducing multi-party computation techniques such as garbled circuits, which could make such tests doubly private: the prover does not reveal who they are to the verifier, and the verifier does not reveal their verification mechanism to the prover. Instead, both parties make the computation together and only learn the output.

Another powerful technique is designated-verifier proofs. In general, “data” is slippery: if I send a movie to you, I cannot technologically prevent you from recording and sending it to a third party. Workarounds like Digital Rights Management (DRM) have at best limited e￾ectiveness, and often come at great costs to users. Proofs, however, are not slippery in the same way. If Amma wants to prove some property X about her SBTs to Bob, she can make a zero knowledge proof of the statement “I hold SBTs that satisfy property X, OR I have the access key to Bob’s Soul.” Bob would find this statement convincing: he knows that he did not make the proof, and so Amma must actually have SBTs that satisfy property X. But if Bob passes the proof along to Cuifen, Cuifen would not be convinced: for all he knows, Bob could have made the proof with his own key. This can be made even stronger with verifiable delay functions (VDFs): Amma can make and present a proof that can only be made with the required SBTs right now, but anyone else will be able to make five minutes from now. This means it is possible to represent sophisticated access permissions to trustworthy proofs about data despite the impossibility of making the same kinds of selective permissions to the raw data itself, which may simply be copy and pasted. This may take us quite far nonetheless. Just as blockchains o￾er traceability in transactions that prevents someone from right-click copy-and-pasting a valuable NFT (and sybil attacking the original owner), similarly SBTs can o￾er traceability in social prevenance, which at minimum can reduce the value of copy-and-pasted data with unverified origins.

These off-chain data and zero-knowledge techniques are compatible with negative reputation—SBTs that are made visible even if the holder does not want them to be visible. Important examples of negative reputation include credit history, data about unpaid loans, negative reviews and complaints from business partners, and SBTs attesting to social connections relevant for coordination. Blockchains coupled with the same cryptography could offer a potential solution: Souls could be forced by smart contract logic to incorporate negative SBTs into a data structure like a Merkle tree that is stored off-chain, and any zero knowledge proof or garbled circuit computation would require them to introduce that information, because otherwise there would be a visible “hole” in the provided data that the verifier would recognize. The Unirep protocol is an example of how this might be implemented.

The point of these examples is not to show exactly how cryptographic technology can be used to solve all of the privacy and data permissioning problems with SBTs. Rather, it is to sketch out a few examples to show the power of such technologies. An important future research direction is to scope the exact limits of different kinds of data permissioning and the specific combinations of techniques that work best to achieve the desired level of permissions. Another question is what types of plural property regimes are desirable to govern data, and how to properly unbundle access (“usus”), editing (“abusus”) and cash.

如何存储外链数据的选择由个人决定；可能的解决方案包括（i）他们自己的设备，（ii）他们信任的云服务，或（iii）去中心化网络，例如星际文件系统（IPFS）。将数据存储在链下让我们继续拥有有权写入 SBT 数据的智能合约，但同时拥有读取该数据的单独权限。Bob 可以选择仅在他愿意时透露他的任何 SBT（或他们允许的数据存储）的内容。这已经让我们走得很远，并且具有提高技术可扩展性的进一步好处，因为大多数数据只需要由极少数方处理。但要完全实现多元隐私等属性，以及更细粒度的披露形式，我们还需要更进一步。幸运的是，许多加密技术让我们能够做到这一点。

一组强大的构建块能够以新的方式部分揭示数据，它是密码学的一个分支，称为“零知识证明”。虽然如今零知识证明最常用于保护隐私的资产转移，但它们也可以让人们证明任意陈述，而无需透露陈述本身之外的任何更多信息。例如，在一个政府文件和其他证明可以通过密码证明的世界中，有人可以证明这样的陈述：“我是加拿大公民，年满 18 岁，拥有大学经济学学位和超过 50,000 名 Twitter 关注者，并且谁还没有在这个系统中申请账户。”零知识证明可以通过 SBT 计算来证明灵魂的特征（例如，它具有某些成员资格）。通过引入多方计算技术（例如乱码电路）可以进一步扩展该技术，这可以使此类测试具有双重私密性：证明者不会向验证者透露他们是谁，而验证者不会向证明者透露他们的验证机制。相反，双方一起进行计算，只学习输出。

另一种强大的技术是指定验证者证明。总的来说，“数据”是很滑的：如果我向您发送电影，我无法在技术上阻止您录制并将其发送给第三方。数字版权管理 (DRM) 之类的变通办法充其量只能起到有限的作用，而且通常会给用户带来巨大的成本。然而，证明并不是以同样的方式滑溜的。如果 Amma 想向 Bob 证明一些关于她的 SBT 的属性 X，她可以对“我持有满足属性 X 的 SBT，或者我拥有 Bob 的灵魂的访问密钥”这一陈述进行零知识证明。 Bob 会发现这个陈述令人信服：他知道他没有做出证明，因此 Amma 实际上必须有满足性质 X 的 SBT。但是如果 Bob 将证明传递给 Cuifen，Cuifen 不会被说服：据他所知， Bob 可以用他自己的密钥来证明。这可以通过可验证的延迟函数 (VDF) 变得更加强大：Amma 可以制作并展示目前只能使用所需的 SBT 制作的证明，但其他任何人都可以在五分钟后制作。这意味着尽管不可能对原始数据本身（可能只是简单地复制和粘贴）进行相同类型的选择性权限，但可以表示对有关数据的可信证明的复杂访问权限。尽管如此，这可能会让我们走得很远。正如区块链在交易中提供可追溯性以防止某人右键单击复制和粘贴有价值的 NFT（以及女巫攻击原始所有者）一样，SBT 可以在社会传播方面提供可追溯性，这至少可以减少来源未经验证的复制粘贴数据的价值。

这些链下数据和零知识技术与负面声誉兼容——即使持有者不希望它们可见，SBT 也会变得可见。负面声誉的重要示例包括信用记录、未付贷款数据、负面评论和业务合作伙伴的投诉，以及证明与协调相关的社会关系的 SBT。与相同密码学相结合的区块链可以提供一个潜在的解决方案：智能合约逻辑可以强制 Souls 将负 SBT 合并到数据结构中，例如存储在链外的 Merkle 树，并且任何零知识证明或乱码电路计算都需要他们介绍该信息，否则在提供的数据中会有一个可见的“漏洞”，验证者会识别出来。 Unirep 协议是如何实现这一点的一个例子。

这些示例的重点并不是要准确说明如何使用加密技术来解决 SBT 的所有隐私和数据许可问题。相反，它是勾勒出几个例子来展示这些技术的力量。一个重要的未来研究方向是确定不同类型数据许可的确切限制以及最适合实现所需许可级别的技术的特定组合。 另一个问题是需要什么样的多元财产制度来管理数据，以及如何正确地拆分访问（“usus”）、编辑（“abusus”）和现金。

7.2 Cheating Souls

If SBTs are the social substrate upon which plural property, network goods and intelligences are coordinated, one might be concerned that Souls will try to trick or cheat their way into communities to gain access to governance or property rights that we imagine SBTs permissioning. For example, if many applications depend on SBTs representing conference attendance, unscrupulous conferences could offer such SBTs in exchange for bribes. With enough bribes, humans (and bots) could generate a fake social graph that makes the account look like an authentic human Soul, richly ifferentiated by (fake) SBTs. Just as DAOs can be bribed, so can Souls and the on-chain voting mechanisms which they use. Conversely, if SBTs are used to discount coordination, Souls may avoid SBTs to maximize their influence. Why should we believe that the SBTs a Soul possess accurately reflect their true social commitments rather than simply how they choose to play this game?

One argument is that the varying incentives to cheat may “balance out.” Souls may sort and self-identify into the networks that are important to them at the right scale, much like how Harberger taxes balance out the incentive to over-value and under-value assets to elicit approximately accurate market valuations. Souls will want to hold more SBTs to gain influence within their communities, but on the other hand will eschew SBTs from communities they care less about to score lower on correlation metrics and increase their influence in governance over broader networks.

But it would be naive to assume that the two incentives—to gain access and maximize influence—always evenly cancel out, or even come close to canceling out, as though by magic. There may be many communities that use systems other than SBTs to gate access and governance. Or communities may—counter to our primary assumption about publicity—dole out private SBTs to reflect governance rights, but induce community members to keep these SBTs secret in broader decisions.

The problem of “gaming” should not be understated. It is a significant issue and resolving it is one of the most important foci for future research. Indeed, it is a major reason why open-sourcing many existing algorithms that prioritize or filter for human users is very challenging. To mitigate and deter SBT gaming, we suggest several norms and cryptographic directions:

如果 SBT 是多种财产、网络商品和智能在其上协调的社会基础，人们可能会担心灵魂会试图欺骗或欺骗他们进入社区，以获得我们想象 SBT 允许的治理或财产权。例如，如果许多应用程序依赖于代表会议出席的 SBT，则不道德的会议可能会提供此类 SBT 以换取贿赂。有了足够的贿赂，人类（和机器人）可以生成一个虚假的社交图谱，使该帐户看起来像一个真实的人类灵魂，并被（假的）SBT 丰富地分化。就像 DAO 可以被贿赂一样，Souls 和他们使用的链上投票机制也可以。相反，如果使用 SBT 来降低协调性，Souls 可能会避免 SBT 以最大化其影响力。为什么我们应该相信灵魂拥有的 SBT 准确地反映了他们真正的社会承诺，而不仅仅是他们选择玩这个游戏的方式？

一个论点是，不同的作弊动机可能会“平衡”。灵魂可能会以适当的规模分类和自我识别到对他们来说很重要的网络中，就像哈伯格税收如何平衡高估和低估资产的激励，以得出大致准确的市场估值一样。 Souls 将希望持有更多的 SBT 以在其社区中获得影响力，但另一方面，他们会避开他们不太关心的社区中的 SBT，以在相关性指标上得分较低，并增加他们在更广泛网络治理中的影响力。

但是，如果假设这两种激励措施——获得访问权和最大化影响力——总是均匀地抵消，甚至接近于抵消，就好像施了魔法一样，那就太天真了。可能有许多社区使用 SBT 以外的系统来控制访问和治理。或者社区可能——与我们关于公开的主要假设相反——发放私人 SBT 以反映治理权利，但诱使社区成员在更广泛的决策中对这些 SBT 保密。

“游戏”的问题不容小觑。这是一个重要的问题，解决它是未来研究的最重要的焦点之一。事实上，这也是为什么开源许多为人类用户优先考虑或过滤的现有算法非常具有挑战性的一个主要原因。为了减轻和阻止 SBT 游戏，我们建议了几个规范和加密方向：

1. The ecosystem of SBTs could bootstrap off “thick” community channels, where SBTs signal authentic off-chain community membership with strong social bonds and repeat interactions. This would make it easier for communities to filter and revoke SBTs of impersonators and bots. Such thick channels—which we often find in churches, workplaces, schools, meet-up groups, and organizations in civil society—would provide a more sybil-resistant social substrate to police gaming (e.g., through bots, bribes, impersonation) in more “thin” social channels.
2. Nested communities could require SBTs to force context on potential collusion vectors “just below” them. For example, if a state were holding a funding round or vote, the state might require every participating citizen to also hold an SBT of a defined county and municipality.
3. The openness and cryptographic provability of the SBT ecosystem could itself be used to actively detect collusive patterns and penalize inauthentic behavior—perhaps discounting the voting power of collusive Souls, or obliging Souls to accept SBTs representing negative attestations. For example, if one Soul attests to the humanity of another Soul that turns out to be a bot, the case can be escalated and publicly verified, leading to that Soul having a large number of negative attestations. This already happens to an extent within the GitCoin QF ecosystem, where a range of signals are used to detect “collusive groups.”
4. ZK technology (eg. MACI) could cryptographically prevent some attestations made by a Soul from being provable. This would make attempts to sell certain kinds of attestations non-credible, because the briber would have no way to tell whether or not the bribe recipient followed through on their side of the deal. There has been a large body of research on the use of such techniques for voting, but ultimately any non-financialized social mechanism may end up benefiting from similar ideas.
5. We could encourage whistleblowers as a way of making collusion of significant size unstable. Instead of detecting and penalizing incorrect or abusive behavior, we detect and penalize abusive patterns of collusion. This technique is risky to overuse because of the possibility of false-flag bribes, but it is nevertheless part of the toolkit.
6. We could use mechanisms from peer-prediction theory to encourage reporting to be honest in all cases except where collusion is extremely large. Instead of the conference attesting to attendees’ attendance, attendees could attest to each other’s attendance, so the number of participants that would need to be bribed to attest to a false claim becomes very large. The rewards need not be financial, but could be SBTs, making the rewards more useful to genuine community members than they are to attackers.
7. We could use correlation scores that focus on correlations where there is a large incentive to be honest if a group of Souls share a common interest. For example, the correlation scoring technique used in bounded pairwise quadrating funding uses quadratic funding donations themselves to determine how correlated two participants are, and therefore how much to discount their intersection. If two participants share many common interests, their incentive to express this fact to the QF mechanism is certainly diminished with correlation discounting, but it never becomes zero or negative.

While the range of identity frameworks proposed is almost limitless, there are four particularly prominent and adjacent paradigms widely discussed in the web3 space that merit comparison: the dominant “legacy” identity ecosystem, the pseudonymous economy, proof of personhood, and verifiable credentials. Each paradigm highlights important contributions and challenges for future development of the social identity paradigm we advocate, and we use such limitations as a springboard for exploring future directions. All that considered, we also explain why we believe our social identity primitives of Souls and soulbound tokens are a more promising path forward for privacy regimes.

1. SBT 的生态系统可以引导“厚”的社区渠道，在这些渠道中，SBT 通过强大的社会纽带和重复互动表明真正的链下社区成员身份。 这将使社区更容易过滤和撤销冒充者和机器人的 SBT。 如此密集的渠道——我们经常在教堂、工作场所、学校、聚会小组和民间社会的组织中发现——将为警察博弈（例如，通过机器人、贿赂、冒充）提供更具抗女巫性的社会基础。 “瘦”社交渠道。
2. 嵌套社区可能需要 SBT 将上下文强加在“正下方”的潜在共谋向量上。例如，如果一个州正在举行一轮融资或投票，该州可能会要求每个参与的公民也持有一个确定的县和市的 SBT。
3. SBT 生态系统的开放性和密码学可证明性本身可用于主动检测合谋模式并惩罚不真实行为——可能会降低合谋 Souls 的投票权，或迫使 Souls 接受代表负面证明的 SBT。例如，如果一个灵魂证明另一个灵魂是机器人的人性，那么案件可以升级并公开验证，导致该灵魂有大量负面证明。这在 GitCoin QF 生态系统中已经在一定程度上发生了，其中使用一系列信号来检测“合谋团体”。
4. ZK 技术（例如 MACI）可以通过密码防止灵魂做出的某些证明是可证明的。这将使出售某些类型的证明的尝试变得不可信，因为贿赂者无法判断受贿者是否遵守了他们的交易。已经有大量关于使用这种技术进行投票的研究，但最终任何非金融化的社会机制都可能最终受益于类似的想法。
5. 我们可以鼓励举报人，以此来使大规模的串通变得不稳定。我们不是检测和惩罚不正确或滥用行为，而是检测和惩罚共谋的滥用模式。由于存在虚假贿赂的可能性，这种技术有过度使用的风险，但它仍然是工具包的一部分。
6. 我们可以使用来自同行预测理论的机制来鼓励在所有情况下都诚实报告，除非串通非常大。与会议证明与会者的出席不同，与会者可以证明彼此的出席，因此需要贿赂以证明虚假声明的与会者数量变得非常大。奖励不一定是金钱上的，但可以是 SBT，这使得奖励对真正的社区成员比对攻击者更有用。
7. 如果一群灵魂有共同的兴趣，我们可以使用关注相关性的相关性分数。例如，有界成对二次融资中使用的相关评分技术使用二次融资捐赠本身来确定两个参与者的相关性，从而确定他们的交集的折扣程度。如果两个参与者有许多共同利益，他们向 QF 机制表达这一事实的动机肯定会随着相关性折扣而减少，但它永远不会变成零或负数。

虽然提出的身份框架的范围几乎是无限的，但在 web3 空间中有四个特别突出和相邻的范式被广泛讨论，值得比较：占主导地位的“传统”身份生态系统、假名经济、人格证明和可验证的凭据。每个范式都突出了我们所倡导的社会认同范式未来发展的重要贡献和挑战，我们将这些限制作为探索未来方向的跳板。考虑到所有这些，我们还解释了为什么我们相信我们的灵魂和灵魂令牌的社会身份原语是隐私制度的一条更有希望的前进道路。

Abstract

Web3 today centers around expressing transferable, financialized assets, rather than encoding social
relationships of trust. Yet many core economic activities—such as uncollateralized lending and building personal brands—are built on persistent, non-transferable relationships. In this paper, we illustrate how non-transferable “soulbound” tokens (SBTs) representing the commitments, credentials, and affiliations of “Souls” can encode the trust networks of the real economy to establish provenance and reputation. More importantly, SBTs enable other applications of increasing ambition, such as community wallet recovery, sybil-resistant governance, mechanisms for decentralization, and novel markets with decomposable, shared rights. We call this richer, pluralistic ecosystem “Decentralized Society” (DeSoc)—a co-determined sociality, where Souls and communities come together bottom-up, as emergent properties of each other to co-create plural network goods and intelligences, at a range of scales. Key to this sociality is decomposable property rights and enhanced governance mechanisms—such as quadratic funding discounted by correlation scores—that reward trust and cooperation while protecting networks from capture, extraction, and domination. With such augmented sociality, web3 can eschew today’s hyper-financialization in favor of a more transformative, pluralist future of increasing returns across social distance.

今天的 Web3 以表达可转让的金融化资产为中心，而不是编码信任的社会关系。然而，许多核心经济活动——例如无抵押贷款和建立个人品牌——都是建立在持久的、不可转让的关系之上的。在本文中，我们说明了代表“灵魂”的承诺、凭证和从属关系的不可转让“灵魂绑定”令牌 (SBT) 如何编码实体经济的信任网络以建立出处和声誉。更重要的是，SBT 支持其他雄心勃勃的应用，例如社区钱包恢复、抗女巫治理、去中心化机制以及具有可分解、共享权利的新市场。我们将这个更丰富、多元化的生态系统称为“去中心化社会”（DeSoc）——一种共同决定的社会性，灵魂和社区自下而上地聚集在一起，作为彼此的新兴属性，在一定范围内共同创造多元化的网络商品和智能的规模。这种社会性的关键是可分解的产权和增强的治理机制——例如相关分数打折的二次融资——奖励信任和合作，同时保护网络不被捕获、提取和支配。借助这种增强的社交性，web3 可以避开当今的超金融化，转而支持更具变革性、多元化的未来，即跨社会距离增加回报。

§1 INTRODUCTION

Web3 has stunned the world by forging a parallel system of finance of unprecedented flexibility and
creativity in less than a decade. Cryptographic and economic primitives such as public key cryptography, smart contracts, proof of work, and proof of stake have led to a sophisticated and open ecosystem for expressing financial transactions.

Yet the economic value finance trades on is generated by humans and their relationships. Because
web3 lacks primitives to represent such social identity, it has become fundamentally dependent on the very centralized web2 structures it aims to transcend, replicating their limitations.
Examples of these dependencies include:

1. Most NFT artists rely on centralized platforms like OpenSea and Twitter to commit to
   scarcity and initial provenance.

2. DAOs that try to move beyond simple coin-voting often rely on web2 infrastructure, such
   as social media pro￾les, for sybil resistance.

3. Many web3 participants rely on custodial wallets managed by centralized entities like
   Coinbase or Binance. Decentralized key management systems are not user-friendly for any
   but the most sophisticated.

Furthermore, the lack a native web3 identity makes today’s DeFi ecosystem unable to support activities ubiquitous in the real economy, such as undercollateralized lending or simple contracts, like an apartment lease. In this paper, we illustrate how even small and incremental steps towards representing social identity with soulbound tokens could overcome these limitations and bring the ecosystem far closer to regenerating markets with their underpinning human relationships in a native web3 context.

Even more promising, we highlight how native web3 social identity, with rich social composability, could yield great progress on broader long-standing problems in web3 around wealth concentration and vulnerability of governance to financial attacks, while spurring a Cambrian explosion of innovative political, economic, and social applications. We refer to these use cases and the richer pluralistic ecosystem that they enable as “Decentralized Society” (DeSoc).

Web3 在不到十年的时间里打造了一个具有前所未有的灵活性和创造力的平行金融系统，震惊了世界。密码学和经济原语，例如公钥密码学、智能合约、工作量证明和权益证明，已经形成了一个用于表达金融交易的复杂而开放的生态系统。
然而，金融交易的经济价值是由人类及其关系产生的。因为 web3 缺乏代表这种社会身份的原语，它已经从根本上依赖于它旨在超越的非常集中的 web2 结构，复制它们的局限性。
这些依赖项的示例包括：

1. 大多数 NFT 艺术家依靠 OpenSea 和 Twitter 等中心化平台来承诺稀缺性和初始出处。

2. 试图超越简单的硬币投票的 DAO 通常依赖于 web2 基础设施，例如社交媒体配置文件，以抵抗女巫。

3. 许多 web3 参与者依赖于由 Coinbase 或 Binance 等中心化实体管理的托管钱包。去中心化的密钥管理系统除了最复杂的人外，对任何人都不友好。

此外，缺乏原生的 web3 身份使得今天的 DeFi 生态系统无法支持实体经济中无处不在的活动，例如抵押不足的贷款或简单的合同，例如公寓租赁。在本文中，我们说明了即使是用灵魂绑定的代币表示社会身份的微小和渐进的步骤也可以克服这些限制，并使生态系统更接近于在原生 web3 环境中以人际关系为基础的再生市场。

更有希望的是，我们强调了具有丰富社会可组合性的原生 web3 社会身份如何在 web3 中围绕财富集中和治理易受金融攻击的更广泛长期存在的问题上取得巨大进展，同时刺激寒武纪的创新政治、经济爆炸和社交应用。我们将这些用例和它们所支持的更丰富的多元化生态系统称为“去中心化社会”（DeSoc）。

§2 OUTLINE

We begin by explaining the primitives of DeSoc, centered around accounts (or wallets) holding non-transferable (initially public) “soulbound” tokens (SBTs) representing commitments, credentials, and affiliations. Such tokens would be like an extended resume, issued by other wallets that attest to these social relations.

We then describe a “stairway” of increasingly ambitious applications across the social stack such primitives could empower, including:

• establishing provenance

• unlocking undercollateralized lending markets through reputation

• enabling decentralized key management

• thwarting and compensating for coordinated strategic behavior

• measuring decentralization

• creating novel markets with decomposable, shared rights and permissions

This description culminates with a vision of DeSoc—a co-determined sociality, where Souls and communities come together bottom-up, as emergent properties of each other to co-create plural network goods, including plural intelligences, at a range of social scales.

Finally, we answer several potential concerns and objections, and make comparisons to other identity paradigms familiar in the web3 space, conceding often how our vision is just a first step but nonetheless an advance in programmable privacy and communication. Then, we consider technical pathways to bootstrap the vision we imagine. Building off these, we look forward, more philosophically, to the potential of DeSoc to redirect web3 to a more profound, legitimate, and transformative path.

我们首先解释 DeSoc 的原语，以持有代表承诺、凭证和隶属关系的不可转让（最初是公开的）“灵魂绑定”代币 (SBT) 为中心的账户（或钱包）。这样的代币就像一份扩展的简历，由证明这些社会关系的其他钱包发行。

然后，我们描述了跨社交堆栈的越来越雄心勃勃的应用程序的“阶梯”，这些原语可以赋予权力，包括：

• 确定出处

• 通过声誉打开抵押不足的贷款市场

• 实现分散的密钥管理

• 阻挠和补偿协调的战略行为

• 衡量权力下放

• 创建具有可分解、共享权利和许可的新市场

这种描述以 DeSoc 的愿景达到高潮——一种共同决定的社会性，灵魂和社区自下而上地聚集在一起，作为彼此的新兴属性，在一系列社会尺度上共同创造包括多元智能在内的多元网络商品。
最后，我们回答了几个潜在的担忧和反对意见，并与 web3 空间中熟悉的其他身份范式进行了比较，经常承认我们的愿景只是第一步，但却是可编程隐私和通信方面的进步。然后，我们考虑引导我们想象的愿景的技术途径。在这些基础上，我们从更哲学的角度期待 DeSoc 将 web3 重定向到更深刻、更合法和更具变革性的道路的潜力。

§3 SOULS

Our key primitive is accounts, or wallets, that hold publicly visible, non-transferable (but possibly revocable-by-the-issuer) tokens. We refer to the accounts as “Souls” and tokens held by the accounts as “Soulbound Tokens” (SBTs). We initially assume publicity despite our deep interest in privacy because it is technically simpler to validate as a proof-of-concept, even if limited by the subset of tokens people are willing to publicly share. Later in the paper, we introduce the concept of “programmable privacy” for richer use cases.

Imagine a world where most participants have Souls that store SBTs corresponding to a series of affiliations, memberships, and credentials. For example, a person might have a Soul that stores SBTs representing educational credentials, employment history, or hashes of their writings or works of art. In their simplest form, these SBTs can be “self-certified,” similar to how we share information about ourselves in our CVs. But the true power of this mechanism emerges when SBTs held by one Soul can be issued—or attested—by other Souls, who are counterparties to these relationships. These counterparty Souls could be individuals, companies, or institutions. For example, the Ethereum Foundation could be a Soul that issues SBTs to Souls who attended a developer conference. A university could be a Soul that issues SBTs to graduates. A stadium could be a Soul that issues SBTs to longtime Dodgers fans.

Note there is no requirement for a Soul to be linked to a legal name, or for there to be any protocol-level attempt to ensure “one Soul per human.” A Soul could be a persistent pseudonym with a range of SBTs that cannot easily be linked. We also do not assume non-transferability of Souls across humans. Instead, we try to illustrate how these properties, where needed, can naturally emerge from the design itself.

我们的关键原语是持有公开可见、不可转让（但可能由发行人撤销）代币的账户或钱包。我们将账户称为“灵魂”，将账户持有的代币称为“灵魂绑定代币”（SBT）。尽管我们对隐私有着浓厚的兴趣，但我们最初假设是公开的，因为它在技术上更容易验证为概念验证，即使受到人们愿意公开分享的代币子集的限制。在本文的后面，我们为更丰富的用例引入了“可编程隐私”的概念。
想象一个世界，其中大多数参与者都拥有存储与一系列从属关系、会员资格和证书相对应的 SBT 的灵魂。例如，一个人可能有一个灵魂，它存储代表教育证书、工作经历或他们的著作或艺术作品的哈希值的 SBT。在最简单的形式中，这些 SBT 可以“自我认证”，类似于我们在简历中分享关于自己的信息的方式。但是，当一个灵魂持有的 SBT 可以由作为这些关系的对手的其他灵魂发行或证明时，这种机制的真正力量就会显现出来。这些对手灵魂可能是个人、公司或机构。例如，以太坊基金会可以是一个灵魂，它向参加开发者大会的灵魂发放 SBT。大学可以是向毕业生发放 SBT 的灵魂。体育场可能是向道奇队的长期球迷发放 SBT 的灵魂。
请注意，灵魂不需要与合法名称相关联，也不需要任何协议级别的尝试来确保“每个人一个灵魂”。灵魂可能是一个持久的化名，具有一系列无法轻易链接的 SBT。我们也不假设灵魂在人类之间的不可转移性。相反，我们试图说明这些属性如何在需要时自然地从设计本身中出现。

§4 STAIRWAY TO DESOC

4.1 Art & Soul

4.2 Soul Lending

Perhaps the largest financial value built directly on reputation is credit and uncollateralized lending. Currently, the web3 ecosystem cannot replicate simple forms of uncollateralized lending, because all assets are transferable and saleable—thus simply forms of collateral. The “traditional” financial ecosystem supports many forms of uncollateralized lending, but relies on centralized credit scores to gauge creditworthiness of borrowers who have little incentive to share information about their credit history. But such scores have many flaws. At best, they opaquely overweight and underweight factors relevant to creditworthiness, and bias those who haven’t accumulated su￾cient data—mainly minorities and the poor. At worst, they can enable Black Mirror opaque “social credit” systems that engineer social outcomes and reinforce discriminations.

An ecosystem of SBTs could unlock a censorship-resistant, bottom-up alternative to top-down commercial and “social” credit systems. SBTs that represent education credentials, work history, and rental contracts could serve as a persistent record of credit-relevant history, allowing Souls to stake meaningful reputation to avoid collateral requirements and secure a loan. Loans and credit lines could be represented as non-transferable but revocable SBTs, so they are nested amongst a Soul’s other SBTs—a kind of non-sizable reputational collateral—until they are repaid and subsequently burned, or better yet, replaced with proof of repayment. SBTs offer useful security properties: non-transferability prevents transferring or hiding outstanding loans, while a rich ecosystem of SBTs ensures that borrowers who try to escape their loans (perhaps by spinning up a fresh Soul) will lack SBTs to meaningfully stake their reputation.

The ease of computing public liabilities with SBTs would open-source lending markets. New correlations between SBTs and repayment risk would emerge, birthing better lending algorithms that predict creditworthiness and thereby reduce the role of centralized, opaque credit-scoring infrastructure. Better yet, lending would likely occur within social connections. In particular, SBTs would offer a substrate for community lending practices similar to those pioneered by Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, where members of a social network agree to support one another’s liabilities. Because a Soul’s constellation of SBTs represents memberships across social groups, participants could easily discover other Souls who would be valuable co-participants in a group lending project. Whereas commercial lending is a “lend-it-and-forget-it” until repayment model, community lending might take a “lend-it-and-help-it” approach—combining working capital with human capital with greater rates of return.

How does uncollateralized community lending get o￾ the ground? At the start, we expect Souls to carry only SBTs that reflect information they are comfortable with sharing publicly, such as information in a CV. While limited in scope, it might be a level of resolution sufficient for intra-community lending
experiments to take off, especially if the SBTs are issued by reputable institutions. For example, a constellation of SBTs that show certain programming credentials, participation in several conferences, and work history might be sufficient for a Soul to take a loan (or raise seed capital) for their venture. Such credentials and social relationships already informally play an important, but opaque role in capital allocation like venture capital.

直接建立在声誉之上的最大财务价值也许是信贷和无抵押贷款。目前，web3 生态系统无法复制简单形式的无抵押借贷，因为所有资产都是可转让和可销售的——因此只是抵押形式。“传统”金融生态系统支持多种形式的无抵押贷款，但依赖于集中的信用评分来衡量借款人的信用度，这些借款人几乎没有动力分享有关其信用历史的信息。但这样的分数有很多缺陷。充其量，他们不透明地高估和低估与信用相关的因素，并偏向那些没有积累足够数据的人——主要是少数族裔和穷人。在最坏的情况下，他们可以启用黑镜不透明的“社会信用”系统，从而设计社会成果并加强歧视。

SBT 的生态系统可以解锁自上而下的商业和“社会”信用系统的抗审查、自下而上的替代方案。代表教育证书、工作经历和租赁合同的 SBT 可以作为持续记录与信用相关的历史记录，允许灵魂获得有意义的声誉，以避免抵押要求并获得贷款。贷款和信贷额度可以表示为不可转让但可撤销的 SBT，因此它们嵌套在灵魂的其他 SBT 中——一种规模不大的声誉抵押品——直到它们被偿还并随后被烧毁，或者更好的是，被证明取代还款。SBT 提供了有用的安全属性：不可转让性可防止转移或隐藏未偿还的贷款，而丰富的 SBT 生态系统可确保试图逃避贷款（可能通过旋转新的灵魂）的借款人将缺乏 SBT 来有意义地抵押他们的声誉。

使用 SBT 计算公共负债的便利性将开源贷款市场。SBT 与还款风险之间将出现新的相关性，从而产生更好的贷款算法来预测信用，从而减少集中、不透明的信用评分基础设施的作用。更好的是，借贷很可能发生在社会关系中。特别是，SBT 将为类似于穆罕默德尤努斯和格莱珉银行开创的社区借贷实践提供基础，其中社交网络的成员同意支持彼此的债务。因为一个灵魂的 SBT 星座代表了跨社会群体的成员资格，所以参与者可以很容易地发现其他灵魂，他们将是一个团体借贷项目的有价值的共同参与者。商业贷款是一种“先贷后忘”直至还款的模式，而社区贷款可能会采取“先贷后助”的方式——将营运资本与人力资本结合起来，从而获得更高的回报率。

无抵押社区贷款是如何落地的？一开始，我们希望 Souls 只携带反映他们愿意公开分享的信息的 SBT，例如简历中的信息。虽然范围有限，但它可能足以让社区内借贷实验起飞，特别是如果 SBT 是由信誉良好的机构发行的。例如，显示某些编程证书、参加多个会议和工作经历的 SBT 星座可能足以让灵魂为他们的企业贷款（或筹集种子资金）。这种资历和社会关系已经非正式地在风险投资等资本配置中发挥了重要但不透明的作用。

4.4 Souldrops

So far we have explained how Souls can come to represent individuals and re￾ect their unique traits and solidarities as they acquire SBTs that reflect their affiliations, memberships, and credentials. Such individuation helps Souls build reputations, establish provenance, access uncollateralized lending markets, and protect reputation and identity. But the converse is also true; SBTs also enable communities to be convened at unique intersections of Souls. Thus far web3 has largely relied on token sales or airdrops to summon new communities, which yield little accuracy or precision. Airdrops, in which tokens are algorithmically given for free to a set of wallets, mostly fall to some combination of existing token holders and wallets—easily attacked by sybils, encouraging strategic behavior and the Matthew effect. SBTs offer a radical improvement we call “souldrops.”

“Souldrops” are airdrops based on computations over SBTs and other tokens within a Soul. For example, a DAO that wants to convene a community within a particular layer 1 protocol could souldrop to developers who hold 3 out of the last 5 conference attendance SBTs, or other tokens reflecting attendance like POAPs. Protocols could also programmatically weight token drops across a combination of SBTs. We can imagine a non-profit whose mission is to plant trees dropping governance tokens to Souls who hold a mix of environmental action SBTs, gardening SBTs, and carbon sequestration tokens—perhaps dropping more tokens to the carbon sequestration token-holders.

Souldrops could also introduce novel incentives to encourage community engagement. Dropped SBTs could be engineered to be soulbound for a period but eventually “vest” into transferable tokens over time. Or the reverse could be true. Transferable tokens held for some period could unlock the right to SBTs that confer further governance rights over a protocol. SBTs open a rich possibility space to experiment with mechanisms that maximize community engagement and other goals, like decentralization, which we discuss further below.

到目前为止，我们已经解释了灵魂如何能够代表个人并在他们获得反映他们的隶属关系、成员资格和证书的 SBT 时反映他们的独特特征和团结。这种个性化有助于 Souls 建立声誉、确定出处、进入无抵押贷款市场并保护声誉和身份。但反过来也是如此； SBT 还使社区能够在灵魂的独特交汇处召集。到目前为止，web3 主要依靠代币销售或空投来召唤新社区，这几乎没有准确性或精确度。空投，其中代币通过算法免费提供给一组钱包，主要属于现有代币持有者和钱包的某种组合——很容易被女巫攻击，鼓励战略行为和马太效应。 SBT 提供了一种彻底的改进，我们称之为“灵魂点”。

“Souldrops”是基于灵魂内 SBT 和其他代币计算的空投。例如，想要在特定的第 1 层协议中召集社区的 DAO 可以向持有最近 5 次会议出席 SBT 中的 3 次的开发人员或其他反映出席情况的代币（如 POAP）的开发人员投降。协议还可以在 SBT 组合中以编程方式加权令牌下降。我们可以想象一个非营利组织，其使命是植树，将治理代币投放给持有环境行动 SBT、园艺 SBT 和碳封存代币的灵魂——也许向碳封存代币持有者投放更多代币。

Souldrops 还可以引入新的激励措施来鼓励社区参与。丢弃的 SBT 可以设计为在一段时间内受到灵魂约束，但最终随着时间的推移“归属”为可转让的代币。或者反过来可能是正确的。持有一段时间的可转让代币可以解锁 SBT 的权利，从而赋予协议进一步的治理权。 SBT 为尝试最大化社区参与和其他目标（如权力下放）的机制提供了丰富的可能性空间，我们将在下面进一步讨论。

4.5 The DAO of Souls

Distributed autonomous organizations (DAOs) are virtual communities that come together around a common purpose, coordinated by voting through smart contracts on a public blockchain. While DAOs offer great potential for coordination of global communities across distance and difference, they are vulnerable to sybil attacks where a single user can have multiple wallets to accrue voting power—or in less sophisticated one-token-one-vote style governance, simply hoard tokens to accrue 51% voting power and dispossess the other 49%.

DAOs could mitigate sybil attacks with SBTs in several ways, by:

• computing over a Soul’s constellation of SBTs to differentiate between unique Souls and probable bots, and denying any voting power to a Soul that appears to be a Sybil.
• conferring more voting power to Souls who hold more reputable SBTs—like work or educational credentials, licenses, or certifications.
• issuing specialized “proof-of-personhood” SBTs, which could help other DAOs bootstrap sybil resistance.
• checking for correlations between SBTs held by Souls who support a particular vote, and applying a lower vote weight to voters who are highly correlated.

The latter idea of correlation checking is particularly promising and novel. A vote supported by many Souls who all share the same SBT(s) is more likely to be a Sybil attack and—even if not a Sybil attack—such a vote is more likely to be a group of Souls who are making the same error in judgment or who share the same bias, and so should reasonably be weighted less than a vote with the same numerical level of support but from a more diverse base of participants.

We explore the latter idea mathematically in greater detail in the context of quadratic funding in the Appendix, where we introduce a new primitive, called the “correlation score.” This concept of correlation discounting could be extended to structure deliberative conversations. For example, DAOs susceptible to majoritarian capture could compute over SBTs to bring maximally diverse members together in conversation and ensure minority voices are heard.

DAOs could also rely on SBTs to deter forms of strategic behavior such as “vampire attacks.” In such attacks, a DAO—typically with an associated DeFi protocol of economic value—free-rides off the R&D of another by copying their open-source code and subsequently luring users’ liquidity with a token. DAOs could deter free-riders by first creating a norm around souldropping (perhaps vesting SBTs) only to probable sybil-resistant Souls who delivered liquidity and then withholding souldrops to Souls who shifted their liquidity in a vampire attack. The same mechanism wouldn’t work with airdrops to wallets because a holder can spread liquidity across many wallets to obfuscate their liquidity trail.

DAOs could also use SBTs to make leadership and governance programmatically responsive to their communities. Leadership roles could dynamically shift as the composition of the community shifts—as reflected in the changing distribution of SBTs across member Souls. A subset of members could be elevated to potential officer roles based on their intersectionality and coverage across multiple communities within the DAO. Protocols that value community cohesion could use SBTs to keep intersectional Souls at the center. Alternatively, DAOs may opt for governance that elevates certain combinations of traits more than others, such as diversity among zip codes or participation among a subset of special hobby DAOs.

分布式自治组织 (DAO) 是围绕一个共同目的聚集在一起的虚拟社区，通过公共区块链上的智能合约投票进行协调。虽然 DAO 为跨距离和差异的全球社区协调提供了巨大的潜力，但它们很容易受到女巫攻击，其中单个用户可以拥有多个钱包来积累投票权——或者在不太复杂的单代币一票式治理中，简单地囤积代币累积 51% 的投票权并剥夺其他 49% 的投票权。

DAO 可以通过以下几种方式减轻 SBT 的女巫攻击：

• 计算灵魂的 SBT 星座以区分独特的灵魂和可能的机器人，并拒绝对看似女巫的灵魂有任何投票权。
• 将更多的投票权授予持有更有信誉的 SBT（如工作或教育证书、执照或证书）的灵魂。
• 发布专门的“人格证明”SBT，这可以帮助其他 DAO 引导女巫抵抗。
• 检查支持特定投票的灵魂持有的 SBT 之间的相关性，并对高度相关的选民应用较低的投票权重。

后一种相关性检查的想法特别有前途和新颖。由共享相同 SBT 的许多灵魂支持的投票更有可能是女巫攻击，即使不是女巫攻击，这样的投票也更有可能是一群犯同样错误的灵魂在判断或谁有相同的偏见，因此应该合理地加权低于具有相同数量支持但来自更多样化的参与者基础的投票。

我们在附录中的二次融资的背景下更详细地探讨了后一种想法，我们在其中引入了一个新的原语，称为“相关分数”。这种相关折扣的概念可以扩展到构建审议对话。例如，容易被多数派俘虏的 DAO 可以通过 SBT 进行计算，以将最大程度不同的成员聚集在一起进行对话，并确保听到少数派的声音。

DAO 还可以依靠 SBT 来阻止各种形式的战略行为，例如“吸血鬼攻击”。在此类攻击中，DAO（通常具有相关的具有经济价值的 DeFi 协议）通过复制其开源代码并随后用代币吸引用户的流动性来搭便车。 DAO 可以阻止搭便车者，首先围绕灵魂投掷（可能授予 SBT）创建一个规范，仅针对提供流动性的可能的抗女巫灵魂，然后将灵魂投递给在吸血鬼攻击中转移流动性的灵魂。同样的机制不适用于空投到钱包，因为持有人可以将流动性分散到许多钱包中以混淆他们的流动性轨迹。

DAO 还可以使用 SBT 以编程方式响应其社区的领导和治理。领导角色可以随着社区组成的变化而动态变化——这反映在 SBT 在成员灵魂中的分布变化中。根据 DAO 内多个社区的交叉性和覆盖范围，可以将一部分成员提升为潜在的官员角色。重视社区凝聚力的协议可以使用 SBT 将交叉灵魂保持在中心。或者，DAO 可能会选择比其他更提升某些特征组合的治理，例如邮政编码之间的多样性或特殊爱好 DAO 子集的参与。

4.6 Measuring Decentralization through Pluralism

Measuring Decentralization through Pluralism

When analyzing real-world ecosystems, it is desirable to measure how decentralized the ecosystem actually is. To what extent is the ecosystem truly decentralized, and to what extent is the decentralization “fake” and the ecosystem de-facto dominated by one or a small set of coordinating entities?

Two popular decentralization metrics are the Nakamoto coefficient proposed by Balaji Srinivasan, which measures how many distinct entities need to be combined to gather 51% of some resource, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index used to measure market concentration for antitrust purposes, calculated by summing the squares of the market shares of the market participants. These approaches, however, leave open key questions of what are the correct resources to measure, how to deal with partial coordination, and the gray areas in what constitutes a “distinct entity.”

For example, nominally independent firms may have many major shareholders in common, have directors who are friends with each other, or be regulated by the same government. In the context of token protocols, measuring decentralization of token holdings by looking at on-chain wallets is wildly inaccurate because many people have multiple wallets, and some wallets (e.g., exchanges) represent many people. Moreover, even if addresses could be traced back to unique individuals, those individuals could be socially correlated groups prone to accidental coordination (at best) or intentional collusion (at worst). A better way of measuring decentralization would capture social dependencies, weak affiliations, and strong solidarities.

SBTs support a different way of measuring the level of decentralization (or pluralism) in a DAO, protocol, or network.

• As a first step, protocol could limit token voting to reasonably sybil-resistant (or SBT rich) Souls.

• As a second step, a protocol could examine the correlations between SBTs held by different Souls and discount votes by Souls (pooling them as only partially separate) if they share a large number of SBTs. (We explore the latter idea mathematically in greater detail in the context of quadratic funding in Appendix A, where we introduce a new primitive, called the “correlation score.”)

• As a third step, to zoom out and get a sense of the decentralization across the network, one could measure the correlations between SBTs held by Souls among and across different layers of the network stack—measuring correlations in voting, token ownership, governance-related communication, and even control over computational resources.

SBTs allow us to begin to measure the decentralization of an interoperating and layered ecosystem that is very di￾cult to measure at all today. There is still a large, open question of what formulas would best capture what we want to measure and be least vulnerable to manipulation. There are also many questions about how to examine the relationships of SBTs—weighting some SBTs more than others, discounting nested SBTs, or also factoring in the composition of transferable tokens within Souls. However, with a rich ecosystem of Souls and SBTs, a much larger amount of data would be available to make these calculations and move towards meaningful decentralization.

通过多元化衡量去中心化

在分析现实世界的生态系统时，需要衡量生态系统的去中心化程度。生态系统在多大程度上真正去中心化，去中心化在多大程度上是“假的”，生态系统事实上由一个或一小部分协调实体主导？

两个流行的去中心化指标是 Balaji Srinivasan 提出的 Nakamoto 系数，它衡量需要合并多少不同的实体才能收集 51% 的资源，以及用于衡量反垄断目的的市场集中度的 Herfindahl-Hirschman 指数，通过将市场参与者的市场份额的平方。然而，这些方法留下的关键问题是什么是要衡量的正确资源、如何处理部分协调以及构成”不同实体”的灰色区域。

例如，名义上独立的公司可能有许多共同的大股东，有彼此是朋友的董事，或者受同一政府监管。在代币协议的背景下，通过查看链上钱包来衡量代币持有量的去中心化是非常不准确的，因为很多人有多个钱包，而一些钱包（例如交易所）代表了很多人。此外，即使地址可以追溯到独特的个人，这些个人也可能是容易发生意外协调（最好的情况）或故意勾结（最坏的情况）的社会相关群体。衡量权力下放的更好方法是捕捉社会依赖、弱联系和强大的团结。

SBT 支持一种不同的方式来衡量 DAO、协议或网络中的去中心化（或多元化）水平。

• 作为第一步，协议可以将代币投票限制为合理抗女巫（或富含 SBT）的灵魂。

• 作为第二步，如果不同灵魂拥有大量 SBT，协议可以检查不同灵魂持有的 SBT 与灵魂的折扣投票之间的相关性（将它们作为仅部分分开的池）。（我们在附录 A 的二次融资背景下更详细地探讨了后一个想法，我们在其中引入了一个新的原语，称为“相关分数”。）

• 作为第三步，为了缩小并了解整个网络的去中心化，可以测量 Souls 持有的 SBT 在网络堆栈的不同层之间和跨层之间的相关性——测量投票、代币所有权、治理方面的相关性——相关的通信，甚至对计算资源的控制。

SBT 使我们能够开始衡量当今很难衡量的互操作和分层生态系统的去中心化程度。关于哪些公式最能捕捉我们想要测量的内容并且最不容易受到操纵，仍然存在一个很大的悬而未决的问题。还有很多关于如何检查 SBT 的关系的问题——对某些 SBT 的权重比其他的更高，对嵌套的 SBT 进行折扣，或者还考虑到 Souls 中可转让代币的组成。然而，随着 Souls 和 SBT 的丰富生态系统，大量数据可用于进行这些计算并朝着有意义的去中心化方向发展。

4.7 Plural Property

DAOs often own—or organize around owning—assets, both in the virtual and physical worlds. So
far web3’s scope has largely been limited to a narrow class of property whose bundle of rights are wholly transferable: tokens, NFTs, artworks, first editions or rare manuscripts like the U.S. Constitution. But the emphasis on transferability has been to web3’s detriment, making it incapable of representing and supporting some of the simplest and ubiquitous property contracts today, such as apartment leases. Property rights are defined in the Roman legal tradition as bundles of rights to use (“usus”), consume or destroy (“abusus”), and profit (“fructus”). Rarely are all these rights jointly vested in the same owner. Apartment leases, for example, confer limited rights of use (“usus”) to the lessor, but not unfettered rights to destroy the apartment (“abusus”), sell it off (“fructus”), or even transfer use (subletting). Rights of real property (land) are typically encumbered by a range of restrictions on private use, grants of public rights of access, limits on rights of sale, and even rights of purchase by eminent domain. They are also typically encumbered with mortgages that transfer some financial value to lenders.

The future of property innovation is unlikely to build on wholly transferable private property so far
imagined web3. Rather innovation will hinge on the ability to decompose property rights to match features of existing property regimes, and code even richer elaborations. Corporations and other
organizational forms evolved precisely to reconfigure property rights in even more creative ways—for
example, granting employees access to proprietary facilities (“usus”), but reserving for managers rights to change or damage assets (“abusus”), while paying shareholders most financial benefit (“fructus”). SBTs have the flexibility to represent and proliferate such nuanced property rights of both physical and virtual assets, while encouraging new experiments. Here are just a few use cases:

• Permissioning access to privately or publicly controlled resources (e.g., homes, cars, museums, parks, and virtual equivalents). Transferable NFTs fail to capture this use case well because often access rights are conditional and non-transferable: if I trust you to enter my backyard and use it as recreational space, that does not imply that I trust you to sub-license that permission to someone else.
• Data Cooperatives where SBTs grant data access to researchers, while instantiating members’ rights to grant access (perhaps by quadratic vote) and bargain for economic rights to discoveries and intellectual property born out of research. We explore this further in Section 4 on Plural Sensemaking.
• Experiments with local currencies with rules that make them more valuable to hold and spend by Souls who live in a particular region or are part of a particular community.
• Experiments in participation where SBTs create a continuous basis for less contextualized Souls (e.g., immigrants, adolescents) to gain influence within novel and broader networks. Such Souls would begin with narrow SBTs that pool them with their families or local communities. As their affiliations gradually diversify, they would gain broader SBTs that instantiate voting rights to influence broader networks—in the spirit of Danielle Allen’s idea of polypolitanism—a process that currently is mediated by arbitrary age and residence cut-offs.
• Experiments in market design, such as Harberger taxation and SALSA (self-assessed licenses sold at auction), where holders of an asset post a self-assessed price at which anyone else can buy the asset from them, and must periodically pay a tax proportional to the self-assessed price to maintain control. SBTs could be used to create more nuanced versions of SALSA—for example, where rights of participation are approved by the community to minimize strategic behavior from within or outside the community.
• Experiments in democratic mechanism design such as quadratic voting. Holders of SBTs representing membership in a community could quadratically vote on parameters such as incentives and tax rates. Ultimately, “markets” and “politics” are not separate design spaces; SBTs can be a major part of a technological stack that enables the entire space between the two categories to be explored. Provision of public goods through quadratic funding is another such intersection.

Of course, there are dystopian scenarios to consider. Immigration systems could be permissioned with migratory SBTs. Regulatory capture could be codified in nested community tokens, where homeowners have a disproportionate voting power and stall housing construction. SBTs could automate red-lining. As we discuss further below, these scenarios should be considered within the context of the current opaque-top-down permissions and discriminations. SBTs make discrimination more transparent and therefore potentially contestable.

DAO 通常在虚拟世界和物理世界中拥有或围绕拥有资产进行组织。到目前为止，web3 的范围主要局限于一小类财产，其权利捆绑可以完全转让：代币、NFT、艺术品、第一版或像美国宪法这样的稀有手稿。但是，对可转让性的强调对 web3 不利，使其无法代表和支持当今一些最简单且无处不在的财产合同，例如公寓租赁。财产权在罗马法律传统中被定义为使用权（“usus”）、消费或破坏权（“abusus”）和利润（“fructus”）的组合。很少有所有这些权利共同归属于同一所有者。例如，公寓租赁授予出租人有限的使用权（“usus”），但不授予出租人摧毁公寓（“abusus”）、出售（“fructus”）甚至转让使用权（转租）的不受限制的权利.不动产（土地）的权利通常受到一系列私人使用限制、公共使用权授予、销售权限制，甚至征用权购买权的限制。他们通常还背负着将一些财务价值转移给贷方的抵押贷款。

财产创新的未来不太可能建立在迄今为止想象的 web3 完全可转让的私有财产之上。相反，创新将取决于分解财产权以匹配现有财产制度特征的能力，并编写更丰富的细节。公司和其他组织形式的演变恰恰是为了以更具创造性的方式重新配置产权——例如，授予员工使用专有设施（“usus”）的权限，但保留经理更改或损坏资产的权利（“abusus”），同时支付股东最大的经济利益（“结果”）。 SBT 可以灵活地代表和扩大物理和虚拟资产的细微产权，同时鼓励新的实验。这里只是一些用例：

• 允许访问私人或公共控制的资源（例如，住宅、汽车、博物馆、公园和虚拟等价物）。可转让的 NFT 未能很好地捕捉到这个用例，因为访问权限通常是有条件的且不可转让的：如果我相信你会进入我的后院并将其用作娱乐空间，这并不意味着我相信你会将该许可转授给其他人。
• SBT 授予研究人员数据访问权限的数据合作社，同时赋予成员授予访问权限的权利（可能通过二次投票），并就研究产生的发现和知识产权的经济权利进行谈判。我们将在第 4 节“复数意义构建”中进一步探讨这一点。
• 试验当地货币的规则，让居住在特定地区或属于特定社区的灵魂更有价值地持有和消费。
• 参与实验，其中 SBT 为较少情境化的灵魂（例如移民、青少年）在新颖和更广泛的网络中获得影响力创造持续的基础。这样的灵魂将从狭窄的 SBT 开始，将他们与家人或当地社区集中在一起。随着他们的从属关系逐渐多样化，他们将获得更广泛的 SBT，以实例化投票权以影响更广泛的网络——本着 Danielle Allen 的多元政治理念的精神——这一过程目前由任意年龄和居住地截止进行调解。
• 市场设计实验，例如 Harberger 税收和 SALSA（在拍卖中出售的自我评估许可证），资产持有人发布自我评估价格，任何其他人都可以从他们那里购买资产，并且必须定期缴纳税款与自我评估的价格成正比，以保持控制。 SBT 可用于创建更细微的 SALSA 版本——例如，社区批准参与权，以尽量减少来自社区内部或外部的战略行为。
• 二次投票等民主机制设计实验。代表社区成员的 SBT 持有者可以对激励和税率等参数进行二次投票。归根结底，“市场”和“政治”不是独立的设计空间。 SBT 可以成为技术堆栈的主要部分，可以探索两个类别之间的整个空间。通过二次融资提供公共产品是另一个这样的交叉点。

当然，还有一些反乌托邦场景需要考虑。移民系统可以通过迁移 SBT 获得许可。 监管捕获可以编码在嵌套的社区代币中，其中房主拥有不成比例的投票权并阻碍住房建设。SBT 可以使红线自动化。 正如我们在下面进一步讨论的那样，应该在当前不透明的自上而下的权限和歧视的背景下考虑这些场景。 SBT 使歧视更加透明，因此可能具有争议性。

4.8 From Private and Public Goods to Plural Network Goods

从私人和公共产品到多元网络产品

§5 PLURAL SENSEMAKING

An example of plural network goods that are of increasing salience in a digital world are predictive models built off user data. Both artificial intelligence (AI) and prediction markets seek to predict future events based on data primarily elicited from people. But both paradigms are limited in different and nearly opposite ways. The dominant paradigm in AI eschews incentives, instead hoovering up (public or privately surveilled) data feeds and synthesizing them into predictions through proprietary large-scale, non-linear models—harnessing the default web2 monopoly on “usus” without any “fructus” flowing to data laborers. Prediction markets take the opposite approach, where people bet on outcome in the hopes of financial gains, relying entirely on economic incentives of financial speculation (“fructus”) without synthesizing the beliefs of bettors to produce composable models. At the same time, both of these paradigms yield conclusions that are characterized as “objective” truths; whereas AI models are portrayed as “universal” or “generally intelligent,” prediction markets are portrayed as summarizing all the beliefs of the market participants in a single number: equilibrium price.

A more productive paradigm is to eschew these extremes, and instead draw on the virtues of both, while compensating for their weaknesses and enriching their breadth. We propose thoughtfully combining the complexity of non-linear AI models with the market incentives of prediction markets to transform passive data laborers into active data creators. With such provenance-rich information rooted in the sociality of data creators, we illustrate how DeSoc can unlock plural network(ed) intelligence more powerful than either approach.

5.1 Prediction Markets to Prediction Plurality

5.2 Artificial Intelligence to Plural Intelligence

5.3 Programmable Plural Privacy

在数字世界中越来越显着的多种网络商品的一个例子是基于用户数据构建的预测模型。人工智能 (AI) 和预测市场都试图根据主要从人们那里获得的数据来预测未来事件。但是这两种范式都以不同且几乎相反的方式受到限制。 AI 中的主导范式避开了激励措施，而是收集（公共或私人监视的）数据馈送，并通过专有的大规模非线性模型将它们综合成预测——利用默认的 web2 对“usus”的垄断，而没有任何“fructus”流动给数据工作者。预测市场采取相反的方法，人们在结果上下注，希望获得经济收益，完全依赖金融投机（“水果”）的经济激励，而不综合投注者的信念来产生可组合的模型。同时，这两种范式都得出了被称为“客观”真理的结论。人工智能模型被描述为“通用”或“普遍智能”，而预测市场被描述为将市场参与者的所有信念总结为一个数字：均衡价格。

一个更有成效的范式是避开这些极端，取而代之的是利用两者的优点，同时弥补它们的弱点并丰富它们的广度。我们建议将非线性 AI 模型的复杂性与预测市场的市场激励相结合，将被动的数据劳动者转变为主动的数据创造者。有了这些植根于数据创建者的社交性的来源丰富的信息，我们说明了 DeSoc 如何能够解锁比任何一种方法都更强大的多元网络智能。

5.1 预测复数的预测市场

5.2 人工智能到多元智能

5.3 可编程复数隐私