翻译1-Decentralized Society Finding Web3 Soul

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Abstract

Web3 today centers around expressing transferable, financialized assets, rather than encoding social
relationships of trust. Yet many core economic activities—such as uncollateralized lending and building personal brands—are built on persistent, non-transferable relationships. In this paper, we illustrate how non-transferable “soulbound” tokens (SBTs) representing the commitments, credentials, and affiliations of “Souls” can encode the trust networks of the real economy to establish provenance and reputation. More importantly, SBTs enable other applications of increasing ambition, such as community wallet recovery, sybil-resistant governance, mechanisms for decentralization, and novel markets with decomposable, shared rights. We call this richer, pluralistic ecosystem “Decentralized Society” (DeSoc)—a co-determined sociality, where Souls and communities come together bottom-up, as emergent properties of each other to co-create plural network goods and intelligences, at a range of scales. Key to this sociality is decomposable property rights and enhanced governance mechanisms—such as quadratic funding discounted by correlation scores—that reward trust and cooperation while protecting networks from capture, extraction, and domination. With such augmented sociality, web3 can eschew today’s hyper-financialization in favor of a more transformative, pluralist future of increasing returns across social distance.

今天的 Web3 以表达可转让的金融化资产为中心，而不是编码信任的社会关系。然而，许多核心经济活动——例如无抵押贷款和建立个人品牌——都是建立在持久的、不可转让的关系之上的。在本文中，我们说明了代表“灵魂”的承诺、凭证和从属关系的不可转让“灵魂绑定”令牌 (SBT) 如何编码实体经济的信任网络以建立出处和声誉。更重要的是，SBT 支持其他雄心勃勃的应用，例如社区钱包恢复、抗女巫治理、去中心化机制以及具有可分解、共享权利的新市场。我们将这个更丰富、多元化的生态系统称为“去中心化社会”（DeSoc）——一种共同决定的社会性，灵魂和社区自下而上地聚集在一起，作为彼此的新兴属性，在一定范围内共同创造多元化的网络商品和智能的规模。这种社会性的关键是可分解的产权和增强的治理机制——例如相关分数打折的二次融资——奖励信任和合作，同时保护网络不被捕获、提取和支配。借助这种增强的社交性，web3 可以避开当今的超金融化，转而支持更具变革性、多元化的未来，即跨社会距离增加回报。

§1 INTRODUCTION

Web3 has stunned the world by forging a parallel system of finance of unprecedented flexibility and
creativity in less than a decade. Cryptographic and economic primitives such as public key cryptography, smart contracts, proof of work, and proof of stake have led to a sophisticated and open ecosystem for expressing financial transactions.

Yet the economic value finance trades on is generated by humans and their relationships. Because
web3 lacks primitives to represent such social identity, it has become fundamentally dependent on the very centralized web2 structures it aims to transcend, replicating their limitations.
Examples of these dependencies include:

  1. Most NFT artists rely on centralized platforms like OpenSea and Twitter to commit to
    scarcity and initial provenance.

  2. DAOs that try to move beyond simple coin-voting often rely on web2 infrastructure, such
    as social media pro￾les, for sybil resistance.

  3. Many web3 participants rely on custodial wallets managed by centralized entities like
    Coinbase or Binance. Decentralized key management systems are not user-friendly for any
    but the most sophisticated.

Furthermore, the lack a native web3 identity makes today’s DeFi ecosystem unable to support activities ubiquitous in the real economy, such as undercollateralized lending or simple contracts, like an apartment lease. In this paper, we illustrate how even small and incremental steps towards representing social identity with soulbound tokens could overcome these limitations and bring the ecosystem far closer to regenerating markets with their underpinning human relationships in a native web3 context.

Even more promising, we highlight how native web3 social identity, with rich social composability, could yield great progress on broader long-standing problems in web3 around wealth concentration and vulnerability of governance to financial attacks, while spurring a Cambrian explosion of innovative political, economic, and social applications. We refer to these use cases and the richer pluralistic ecosystem that they enable as “Decentralized Society” (DeSoc).

Web3 在不到十年的时间里打造了一个具有前所未有的灵活性和创造力的平行金融系统，震惊了世界。密码学和经济原语，例如公钥密码学、智能合约、工作量证明和权益证明，已经形成了一个用于表达金融交易的复杂而开放的生态系统。
然而，金融交易的经济价值是由人类及其关系产生的。因为 web3 缺乏代表这种社会身份的原语，它已经从根本上依赖于它旨在超越的非常集中的 web2 结构，复制它们的局限性。
这些依赖项的示例包括：

  1. 大多数 NFT 艺术家依靠 OpenSea 和 Twitter 等中心化平台来承诺稀缺性和初始出处。

  2. 试图超越简单的硬币投票的 DAO 通常依赖于 web2 基础设施，例如社交媒体配置文件，以抵抗女巫。

  3. 许多 web3 参与者依赖于由 Coinbase 或 Binance 等中心化实体管理的托管钱包。去中心化的密钥管理系统除了最复杂的人外，对任何人都不友好。

此外，缺乏原生的 web3 身份使得今天的 DeFi 生态系统无法支持实体经济中无处不在的活动，例如抵押不足的贷款或简单的合同，例如公寓租赁。在本文中，我们说明了即使是用灵魂绑定的代币表示社会身份的微小和渐进的步骤也可以克服这些限制，并使生态系统更接近于在原生 web3 环境中以人际关系为基础的再生市场。

更有希望的是，我们强调了具有丰富社会可组合性的原生 web3 社会身份如何在 web3 中围绕财富集中和治理易受金融攻击的更广泛长期存在的问题上取得巨大进展，同时刺激寒武纪的创新政治、经济爆炸和社交应用。我们将这些用例和它们所支持的更丰富的多元化生态系统称为“去中心化社会”（DeSoc）。

§2 OUTLINE

We begin by explaining the primitives of DeSoc, centered around accounts (or wallets) holding non-transferable (initially public) “soulbound” tokens (SBTs) representing commitments, credentials, and affiliations. Such tokens would be like an extended resume, issued by other wallets that attest to these social relations.

We then describe a “stairway” of increasingly ambitious applications across the social stack such primitives could empower, including:

  • establishing provenance

  • unlocking undercollateralized lending markets through reputation

  • enabling decentralized key management

  • thwarting and compensating for coordinated strategic behavior

  • measuring decentralization

  • creating novel markets with decomposable, shared rights and permissions

This description culminates with a vision of DeSoc—a co-determined sociality, where Souls and communities come together bottom-up, as emergent properties of each other to co-create plural network goods, including plural intelligences, at a range of social scales.

Finally, we answer several potential concerns and objections, and make comparisons to other identity paradigms familiar in the web3 space, conceding often how our vision is just a first step but nonetheless an advance in programmable privacy and communication. Then, we consider technical pathways to bootstrap the vision we imagine. Building off these, we look forward, more philosophically, to the potential of DeSoc to redirect web3 to a more profound, legitimate, and transformative path.

我们首先解释 DeSoc 的原语，以持有代表承诺、凭证和隶属关系的不可转让（最初是公开的）“灵魂绑定”代币 (SBT) 为中心的账户（或钱包）。这样的代币就像一份扩展的简历，由证明这些社会关系的其他钱包发行。

然后，我们描述了跨社交堆栈的越来越雄心勃勃的应用程序的“阶梯”，这些原语可以赋予权力，包括：

  • 确定出处

  • 通过声誉打开抵押不足的贷款市场

  • 实现分散的密钥管理

  • 阻挠和补偿协调的战略行为

  • 衡量权力下放

  • 创建具有可分解、共享权利和许可的新市场

这种描述以 DeSoc 的愿景达到高潮——一种共同决定的社会性，灵魂和社区自下而上地聚集在一起，作为彼此的新兴属性，在一系列社会尺度上共同创造包括多元智能在内的多元网络商品。
最后，我们回答了几个潜在的担忧和反对意见，并与 web3 空间中熟悉的其他身份范式进行了比较，经常承认我们的愿景只是第一步，但却是可编程隐私和通信方面的进步。然后，我们考虑引导我们想象的愿景的技术途径。在这些基础上，我们从更哲学的角度期待 DeSoc 将 web3 重定向到更深刻、更合法和更具变革性的道路的潜力。

§3 SOULS

Our key primitive is accounts, or wallets, that hold publicly visible, non-transferable (but possibly revocable-by-the-issuer) tokens. We refer to the accounts as “Souls” and tokens held by the accounts as “Soulbound Tokens” (SBTs). We initially assume publicity despite our deep interest in privacy because it is technically simpler to validate as a proof-of-concept, even if limited by the subset of tokens people are willing to publicly share. Later in the paper, we introduce the concept of “programmable privacy” for richer use cases.

Imagine a world where most participants have Souls that store SBTs corresponding to a series of affiliations, memberships, and credentials. For example, a person might have a Soul that stores SBTs representing educational credentials, employment history, or hashes of their writings or works of art. In their simplest form, these SBTs can be “self-certified,” similar to how we share information about ourselves in our CVs. But the true power of this mechanism emerges when SBTs held by one Soul can be issued—or attested—by other Souls, who are counterparties to these relationships. These counterparty Souls could be individuals, companies, or institutions. For example, the Ethereum Foundation could be a Soul that issues SBTs to Souls who attended a developer conference. A university could be a Soul that issues SBTs to graduates. A stadium could be a Soul that issues SBTs to longtime Dodgers fans.

Note there is no requirement for a Soul to be linked to a legal name, or for there to be any protocol-level attempt to ensure “one Soul per human.” A Soul could be a persistent pseudonym with a range of SBTs that cannot easily be linked. We also do not assume non-transferability of Souls across humans. Instead, we try to illustrate how these properties, where needed, can naturally emerge from the design itself.

我们的关键原语是持有公开可见、不可转让（但可能由发行人撤销）代币的账户或钱包。我们将账户称为“灵魂”，将账户持有的代币称为“灵魂绑定代币”（SBT）。尽管我们对隐私有着浓厚的兴趣，但我们最初假设是公开的，因为它在技术上更容易验证为概念验证，即使受到人们愿意公开分享的代币子集的限制。在本文的后面，我们为更丰富的用例引入了“可编程隐私”的概念。
想象一个世界，其中大多数参与者都拥有存储与一系列从属关系、会员资格和证书相对应的 SBT 的灵魂。例如，一个人可能有一个灵魂，它存储代表教育证书、工作经历或他们的著作或艺术作品的哈希值的 SBT。在最简单的形式中，这些 SBT 可以“自我认证”，类似于我们在简历中分享关于自己的信息的方式。但是，当一个灵魂持有的 SBT 可以由作为这些关系的对手的其他灵魂发行或证明时，这种机制的真正力量就会显现出来。这些对手灵魂可能是个人、公司或机构。例如，以太坊基金会可以是一个灵魂，它向参加开发者大会的灵魂发放 SBT。大学可以是向毕业生发放 SBT 的灵魂。体育场可能是向道奇队的长期球迷发放 SBT 的灵魂。
请注意，灵魂不需要与合法名称相关联，也不需要任何协议级别的尝试来确保“每个人一个灵魂”。灵魂可能是一个持久的化名，具有一系列无法轻易链接的 SBT。我们也不假设灵魂在人类之间的不可转移性。相反，我们试图说明这些属性如何在需要时自然地从设计本身中出现。

§4 STAIRWAY TO DESOC

4.1 Art & Soul

4.2 Soul Lending

Perhaps the largest financial value built directly on reputation is credit and uncollateralized lending. Currently, the web3 ecosystem cannot replicate simple forms of uncollateralized lending, because all assets are transferable and saleable—thus simply forms of collateral. The “traditional” financial ecosystem supports many forms of uncollateralized lending, but relies on centralized credit scores to gauge creditworthiness of borrowers who have little incentive to share information about their credit history. But such scores have many flaws. At best, they opaquely overweight and underweight factors relevant to creditworthiness, and bias those who haven’t accumulated su￾cient data—mainly minorities and the poor. At worst, they can enable Black Mirror opaque “social credit” systems that engineer social outcomes and reinforce discriminations.

An ecosystem of SBTs could unlock a censorship-resistant, bottom-up alternative to top-down commercial and “social” credit systems. SBTs that represent education credentials, work history, and rental contracts could serve as a persistent record of credit-relevant history, allowing Souls to stake meaningful reputation to avoid collateral requirements and secure a loan. Loans and credit lines could be represented as non-transferable but revocable SBTs, so they are nested amongst a Soul’s other SBTs—a kind of non-sizable reputational collateral—until they are repaid and subsequently burned, or better yet, replaced with proof of repayment. SBTs offer useful security properties: non-transferability prevents transferring or hiding outstanding loans, while a rich ecosystem of SBTs ensures that borrowers who try to escape their loans (perhaps by spinning up a fresh Soul) will lack SBTs to meaningfully stake their reputation.

The ease of computing public liabilities with SBTs would open-source lending markets. New correlations between SBTs and repayment risk would emerge, birthing better lending algorithms that predict creditworthiness and thereby reduce the role of centralized, opaque credit-scoring infrastructure. Better yet, lending would likely occur within social connections. In particular, SBTs would offer a substrate for community lending practices similar to those pioneered by Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, where members of a social network agree to support one another’s liabilities. Because a Soul’s constellation of SBTs represents memberships across social groups, participants could easily discover other Souls who would be valuable co-participants in a group lending project. Whereas commercial lending is a “lend-it-and-forget-it” until repayment model, community lending might take a “lend-it-and-help-it” approach—combining working capital with human capital with greater rates of return.

How does uncollateralized community lending get o￾ the ground? At the start, we expect Souls to carry only SBTs that reflect information they are comfortable with sharing publicly, such as information in a CV. While limited in scope, it might be a level of resolution sufficient for intra-community lending
experiments to take off, especially if the SBTs are issued by reputable institutions. For example, a constellation of SBTs that show certain programming credentials, participation in several conferences, and work history might be sufficient for a Soul to take a loan (or raise seed capital) for their venture. Such credentials and social relationships already informally play an important, but opaque role in capital allocation like venture capital.

直接建立在声誉之上的最大财务价值也许是信贷和无抵押贷款。目前，web3 生态系统无法复制简单形式的无抵押借贷，因为所有资产都是可转让和可销售的——因此只是抵押形式。“传统”金融生态系统支持多种形式的无抵押贷款，但依赖于集中的信用评分来衡量借款人的信用度，这些借款人几乎没有动力分享有关其信用历史的信息。但这样的分数有很多缺陷。充其量，他们不透明地高估和低估与信用相关的因素，并偏向那些没有积累足够数据的人——主要是少数族裔和穷人。在最坏的情况下，他们可以启用黑镜不透明的“社会信用”系统，从而设计社会成果并加强歧视。

SBT 的生态系统可以解锁自上而下的商业和“社会”信用系统的抗审查、自下而上的替代方案。代表教育证书、工作经历和租赁合同的 SBT 可以作为持续记录与信用相关的历史记录，允许灵魂获得有意义的声誉，以避免抵押要求并获得贷款。贷款和信贷额度可以表示为不可转让但可撤销的 SBT，因此它们嵌套在灵魂的其他 SBT 中——一种规模不大的声誉抵押品——直到它们被偿还并随后被烧毁，或者更好的是，被证明取代还款。SBT 提供了有用的安全属性：不可转让性可防止转移或隐藏未偿还的贷款，而丰富的 SBT 生态系统可确保试图逃避贷款（可能通过旋转新的灵魂）的借款人将缺乏 SBT 来有意义地抵押他们的声誉。

使用 SBT 计算公共负债的便利性将开源贷款市场。SBT 与还款风险之间将出现新的相关性，从而产生更好的贷款算法来预测信用，从而减少集中、不透明的信用评分基础设施的作用。更好的是，借贷很可能发生在社会关系中。特别是，SBT 将为类似于穆罕默德尤努斯和格莱珉银行开创的社区借贷实践提供基础，其中社交网络的成员同意支持彼此的债务。因为一个灵魂的 SBT 星座代表了跨社会群体的成员资格，所以参与者可以很容易地发现其他灵魂，他们将是一个团体借贷项目的有价值的共同参与者。商业贷款是一种“先贷后忘”直至还款的模式，而社区贷款可能会采取“先贷后助”的方式——将营运资本与人力资本结合起来，从而获得更高的回报率。

无抵押社区贷款是如何落地的？一开始，我们希望 Souls 只携带反映他们愿意公开分享的信息的 SBT，例如简历中的信息。虽然范围有限，但它可能足以让社区内借贷实验起飞，特别是如果 SBT 是由信誉良好的机构发行的。例如，显示某些编程证书、参加多个会议和工作经历的 SBT 星座可能足以让灵魂为他们的企业贷款（或筹集种子资金）。这种资历和社会关系已经非正式地在风险投资等资本配置中发挥了重要但不透明的作用。

4.4 Souldrops

So far we have explained how Souls can come to represent individuals and re￾ect their unique traits and solidarities as they acquire SBTs that reflect their affiliations, memberships, and credentials. Such individuation helps Souls build reputations, establish provenance, access uncollateralized lending markets, and protect reputation and identity. But the converse is also true; SBTs also enable communities to be convened at unique intersections of Souls. Thus far web3 has largely relied on token sales or airdrops to summon new communities, which yield little accuracy or precision. Airdrops, in which tokens are algorithmically given for free to a set of wallets, mostly fall to some combination of existing token holders and wallets—easily attacked by sybils, encouraging strategic behavior and the Matthew effect. SBTs offer a radical improvement we call “souldrops.”

“Souldrops” are airdrops based on computations over SBTs and other tokens within a Soul. For example, a DAO that wants to convene a community within a particular layer 1 protocol could souldrop to developers who hold 3 out of the last 5 conference attendance SBTs, or other tokens reflecting attendance like POAPs. Protocols could also programmatically weight token drops across a combination of SBTs. We can imagine a non-profit whose mission is to plant trees dropping governance tokens to Souls who hold a mix of environmental action SBTs, gardening SBTs, and carbon sequestration tokens—perhaps dropping more tokens to the carbon sequestration token-holders.

Souldrops could also introduce novel incentives to encourage community engagement. Dropped SBTs could be engineered to be soulbound for a period but eventually “vest” into transferable tokens over time. Or the reverse could be true. Transferable tokens held for some period could unlock the right to SBTs that confer further governance rights over a protocol. SBTs open a rich possibility space to experiment with mechanisms that maximize community engagement and other goals, like decentralization, which we discuss further below.

到目前为止，我们已经解释了灵魂如何能够代表个人并在他们获得反映他们的隶属关系、成员资格和证书的 SBT 时反映他们的独特特征和团结。这种个性化有助于 Souls 建立声誉、确定出处、进入无抵押贷款市场并保护声誉和身份。但反过来也是如此； SBT 还使社区能够在灵魂的独特交汇处召集。到目前为止，web3 主要依靠代币销售或空投来召唤新社区，这几乎没有准确性或精确度。空投，其中代币通过算法免费提供给一组钱包，主要属于现有代币持有者和钱包的某种组合——很容易被女巫攻击，鼓励战略行为和马太效应。 SBT 提供了一种彻底的改进，我们称之为“灵魂点”。

“Souldrops”是基于灵魂内 SBT 和其他代币计算的空投。例如，想要在特定的第 1 层协议中召集社区的 DAO 可以向持有最近 5 次会议出席 SBT 中的 3 次的开发人员或其他反映出席情况的代币（如 POAP）的开发人员投降。协议还可以在 SBT 组合中以编程方式加权令牌下降。我们可以想象一个非营利组织，其使命是植树，将治理代币投放给持有环境行动 SBT、园艺 SBT 和碳封存代币的灵魂——也许向碳封存代币持有者投放更多代币。

Souldrops 还可以引入新的激励措施来鼓励社区参与。丢弃的 SBT 可以设计为在一段时间内受到灵魂约束，但最终随着时间的推移“归属”为可转让的代币。或者反过来可能是正确的。持有一段时间的可转让代币可以解锁 SBT 的权利，从而赋予协议进一步的治理权。 SBT 为尝试最大化社区参与和其他目标（如权力下放）的机制提供了丰富的可能性空间，我们将在下面进一步讨论。

4.5 The DAO of Souls

Distributed autonomous organizations (DAOs) are virtual communities that come together around a common purpose, coordinated by voting through smart contracts on a public blockchain. While DAOs offer great potential for coordination of global communities across distance and difference, they are vulnerable to sybil attacks where a single user can have multiple wallets to accrue voting power—or in less sophisticated one-token-one-vote style governance, simply hoard tokens to accrue 51% voting power and dispossess the other 49%.

DAOs could mitigate sybil attacks with SBTs in several ways, by:

  • computing over a Soul’s constellation of SBTs to differentiate between unique Souls and probable bots, and denying any voting power to a Soul that appears to be a Sybil.
  • conferring more voting power to Souls who hold more reputable SBTs—like work or educational credentials, licenses, or certifications.
  • issuing specialized “proof-of-personhood” SBTs, which could help other DAOs bootstrap sybil resistance.
  • checking for correlations between SBTs held by Souls who support a particular vote, and applying a lower vote weight to voters who are highly correlated.

The latter idea of correlation checking is particularly promising and novel. A vote supported by many Souls who all share the same SBT(s) is more likely to be a Sybil attack and—even if not a Sybil attack—such a vote is more likely to be a group of Souls who are making the same error in judgment or who share the same bias, and so should reasonably be weighted less than a vote with the same numerical level of support but from a more diverse base of participants.

We explore the latter idea mathematically in greater detail in the context of quadratic funding in the Appendix, where we introduce a new primitive, called the “correlation score.” This concept of correlation discounting could be extended to structure deliberative conversations. For example, DAOs susceptible to majoritarian capture could compute over SBTs to bring maximally diverse members together in conversation and ensure minority voices are heard.

DAOs could also rely on SBTs to deter forms of strategic behavior such as “vampire attacks.” In such attacks, a DAO—typically with an associated DeFi protocol of economic value—free-rides off the R&D of another by copying their open-source code and subsequently luring users’ liquidity with a token. DAOs could deter free-riders by first creating a norm around souldropping (perhaps vesting SBTs) only to probable sybil-resistant Souls who delivered liquidity and then withholding souldrops to Souls who shifted their liquidity in a vampire attack. The same mechanism wouldn’t work with airdrops to wallets because a holder can spread liquidity across many wallets to obfuscate their liquidity trail.

DAOs could also use SBTs to make leadership and governance programmatically responsive to their communities. Leadership roles could dynamically shift as the composition of the community shifts—as reflected in the changing distribution of SBTs across member Souls. A subset of members could be elevated to potential officer roles based on their intersectionality and coverage across multiple communities within the DAO. Protocols that value community cohesion could use SBTs to keep intersectional Souls at the center. Alternatively, DAOs may opt for governance that elevates certain combinations of traits more than others, such as diversity among zip codes or participation among a subset of special hobby DAOs.

分布式自治组织 (DAO) 是围绕一个共同目的聚集在一起的虚拟社区，通过公共区块链上的智能合约投票进行协调。虽然 DAO 为跨距离和差异的全球社区协调提供了巨大的潜力，但它们很容易受到女巫攻击，其中单个用户可以拥有多个钱包来积累投票权——或者在不太复杂的单代币一票式治理中，简单地囤积代币累积 51% 的投票权并剥夺其他 49% 的投票权。

DAO 可以通过以下几种方式减轻 SBT 的女巫攻击：

  • 计算灵魂的 SBT 星座以区分独特的灵魂和可能的机器人，并拒绝对看似女巫的灵魂有任何投票权。
  • 将更多的投票权授予持有更有信誉的 SBT（如工作或教育证书、执照或证书）的灵魂。
  • 发布专门的“人格证明”SBT，这可以帮助其他 DAO 引导女巫抵抗。
  • 检查支持特定投票的灵魂持有的 SBT 之间的相关性，并对高度相关的选民应用较低的投票权重。

后一种相关性检查的想法特别有前途和新颖。由共享相同 SBT 的许多灵魂支持的投票更有可能是女巫攻击，即使不是女巫攻击，这样的投票也更有可能是一群犯同样错误的灵魂在判断或谁有相同的偏见，因此应该合理地加权低于具有相同数量支持但来自更多样化的参与者基础的投票。

我们在附录中的二次融资的背景下更详细地探讨了后一种想法，我们在其中引入了一个新的原语，称为“相关分数”。这种相关折扣的概念可以扩展到构建审议对话。例如，容易被多数派俘虏的 DAO 可以通过 SBT 进行计算，以将最大程度不同的成员聚集在一起进行对话，并确保听到少数派的声音。

DAO 还可以依靠 SBT 来阻止各种形式的战略行为，例如“吸血鬼攻击”。在此类攻击中，DAO（通常具有相关的具有经济价值的 DeFi 协议）通过复制其开源代码并随后用代币吸引用户的流动性来搭便车。 DAO 可以阻止搭便车者，首先围绕灵魂投掷（可能授予 SBT）创建一个规范，仅针对提供流动性的可能的抗女巫灵魂，然后将灵魂投递给在吸血鬼攻击中转移流动性的灵魂。同样的机制不适用于空投到钱包，因为持有人可以将流动性分散到许多钱包中以混淆他们的流动性轨迹。

DAO 还可以使用 SBT 以编程方式响应其社区的领导和治理。领导角色可以随着社区组成的变化而动态变化——这反映在 SBT 在成员灵魂中的分布变化中。根据 DAO 内多个社区的交叉性和覆盖范围，可以将一部分成员提升为潜在的官员角色。重视社区凝聚力的协议可以使用 SBT 将交叉灵魂保持在中心。或者，DAO 可能会选择比其他更提升某些特征组合的治理，例如邮政编码之间的多样性或特殊爱好 DAO 子集的参与。

4.6 Measuring Decentralization through Pluralism

Measuring Decentralization through Pluralism

When analyzing real-world ecosystems, it is desirable to measure how decentralized the ecosystem actually is. To what extent is the ecosystem truly decentralized, and to what extent is the decentralization “fake” and the ecosystem de-facto dominated by one or a small set of coordinating entities?

Two popular decentralization metrics are the Nakamoto coefficient proposed by Balaji Srinivasan, which measures how many distinct entities need to be combined to gather 51% of some resource, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index used to measure market concentration for antitrust purposes, calculated by summing the squares of the market shares of the market participants. These approaches, however, leave open key questions of what are the correct resources to measure, how to deal with partial coordination, and the gray areas in what constitutes a “distinct entity.”

For example, nominally independent firms may have many major shareholders in common, have directors who are friends with each other, or be regulated by the same government. In the context of token protocols, measuring decentralization of token holdings by looking at on-chain wallets is wildly inaccurate because many people have multiple wallets, and some wallets (e.g., exchanges) represent many people. Moreover, even if addresses could be traced back to unique individuals, those individuals could be socially correlated groups prone to accidental coordination (at best) or intentional collusion (at worst). A better way of measuring decentralization would capture social dependencies, weak affiliations, and strong solidarities.

SBTs support a different way of measuring the level of decentralization (or pluralism) in a DAO, protocol, or network.

  • As a first step, protocol could limit token voting to reasonably sybil-resistant (or SBT rich) Souls.

  • As a second step, a protocol could examine the correlations between SBTs held by different Souls and discount votes by Souls (pooling them as only partially separate) if they share a large number of SBTs. (We explore the latter idea mathematically in greater detail in the context of quadratic funding in Appendix A, where we introduce a new primitive, called the “correlation score.”)

  • As a third step, to zoom out and get a sense of the decentralization across the network, one could measure the correlations between SBTs held by Souls among and across different layers of the network stack—measuring correlations in voting, token ownership, governance-related communication, and even control over computational resources.

SBTs allow us to begin to measure the decentralization of an interoperating and layered ecosystem that is very di￾cult to measure at all today. There is still a large, open question of what formulas would best capture what we want to measure and be least vulnerable to manipulation. There are also many questions about how to examine the relationships of SBTs—weighting some SBTs more than others, discounting nested SBTs, or also factoring in the composition of transferable tokens within Souls. However, with a rich ecosystem of Souls and SBTs, a much larger amount of data would be available to make these calculations and move towards meaningful decentralization.

通过多元化衡量去中心化

在分析现实世界的生态系统时，需要衡量生态系统的去中心化程度。生态系统在多大程度上真正去中心化，去中心化在多大程度上是“假的”，生态系统事实上由一个或一小部分协调实体主导？

两个流行的去中心化指标是 Balaji Srinivasan 提出的 Nakamoto 系数，它衡量需要合并多少不同的实体才能收集 51% 的资源，以及用于衡量反垄断目的的市场集中度的 Herfindahl-Hirschman 指数，通过将市场参与者的市场份额的平方。然而，这些方法留下的关键问题是什么是要衡量的正确资源、如何处理部分协调以及构成”不同实体”的灰色区域。

例如，名义上独立的公司可能有许多共同的大股东，有彼此是朋友的董事，或者受同一政府监管。在代币协议的背景下，通过查看链上钱包来衡量代币持有量的去中心化是非常不准确的，因为很多人有多个钱包，而一些钱包（例如交易所）代表了很多人。此外，即使地址可以追溯到独特的个人，这些个人也可能是容易发生意外协调（最好的情况）或故意勾结（最坏的情况）的社会相关群体。衡量权力下放的更好方法是捕捉社会依赖、弱联系和强大的团结。

SBT 支持一种不同的方式来衡量 DAO、协议或网络中的去中心化（或多元化）水平。

  • 作为第一步，协议可以将代币投票限制为合理抗女巫（或富含 SBT）的灵魂。

  • 作为第二步，如果不同灵魂拥有大量 SBT，协议可以检查不同灵魂持有的 SBT 与灵魂的折扣投票之间的相关性（将它们作为仅部分分开的池）。（我们在附录 A 的二次融资背景下更详细地探讨了后一个想法，我们在其中引入了一个新的原语，称为“相关分数”。）

  • 作为第三步，为了缩小并了解整个网络的去中心化，可以测量 Souls 持有的 SBT 在网络堆栈的不同层之间和跨层之间的相关性——测量投票、代币所有权、治理方面的相关性——相关的通信，甚至对计算资源的控制。

SBT 使我们能够开始衡量当今很难衡量的互操作和分层生态系统的去中心化程度。关于哪些公式最能捕捉我们想要测量的内容并且最不容易受到操纵，仍然存在一个很大的悬而未决的问题。还有很多关于如何检查 SBT 的关系的问题——对某些 SBT 的权重比其他的更高，对嵌套的 SBT 进行折扣，或者还考虑到 Souls 中可转让代币的组成。然而，随着 Souls 和 SBT 的丰富生态系统，大量数据可用于进行这些计算并朝着有意义的去中心化方向发展。

4.7 Plural Property

DAOs often own—or organize around owning—assets, both in the virtual and physical worlds. So
far web3’s scope has largely been limited to a narrow class of property whose bundle of rights are wholly transferable: tokens, NFTs, artworks, first editions or rare manuscripts like the U.S. Constitution. But the emphasis on transferability has been to web3’s detriment, making it incapable of representing and supporting some of the simplest and ubiquitous property contracts today, such as apartment leases. Property rights are defined in the Roman legal tradition as bundles of rights to use (“usus”), consume or destroy (“abusus”), and profit (“fructus”). Rarely are all these rights jointly vested in the same owner. Apartment leases, for example, confer limited rights of use (“usus”) to the lessor, but not unfettered rights to destroy the apartment (“abusus”), sell it off (“fructus”), or even transfer use (subletting). Rights of real property (land) are typically encumbered by a range of restrictions on private use, grants of public rights of access, limits on rights of sale, and even rights of purchase by eminent domain. They are also typically encumbered with mortgages that transfer some financial value to lenders.

The future of property innovation is unlikely to build on wholly transferable private property so far
imagined web3. Rather innovation will hinge on the ability to decompose property rights to match features of existing property regimes, and code even richer elaborations. Corporations and other
organizational forms evolved precisely to reconfigure property rights in even more creative ways—for
example, granting employees access to proprietary facilities (“usus”), but reserving for managers rights to change or damage assets (“abusus”), while paying shareholders most financial benefit (“fructus”). SBTs have the flexibility to represent and proliferate such nuanced property rights of both physical and virtual assets, while encouraging new experiments. Here are just a few use cases:

  • Permissioning access to privately or publicly controlled resources (e.g., homes, cars, museums, parks, and virtual equivalents). Transferable NFTs fail to capture this use case well because often access rights are conditional and non-transferable: if I trust you to enter my backyard and use it as recreational space, that does not imply that I trust you to sub-license that permission to someone else.
  • Data Cooperatives where SBTs grant data access to researchers, while instantiating members’ rights to grant access (perhaps by quadratic vote) and bargain for economic rights to discoveries and intellectual property born out of research. We explore this further in Section 4 on Plural Sensemaking.
  • Experiments with local currencies with rules that make them more valuable to hold and spend by Souls who live in a particular region or are part of a particular community.
  • Experiments in participation where SBTs create a continuous basis for less contextualized Souls (e.g., immigrants, adolescents) to gain influence within novel and broader networks. Such Souls would begin with narrow SBTs that pool them with their families or local communities. As their affiliations gradually diversify, they would gain broader SBTs that instantiate voting rights to influence broader networks—in the spirit of Danielle Allen’s idea of polypolitanism—a process that currently is mediated by arbitrary age and residence cut-offs.
  • Experiments in market design, such as Harberger taxation and SALSA (self-assessed licenses sold at auction), where holders of an asset post a self-assessed price at which anyone else can buy the asset from them, and must periodically pay a tax proportional to the self-assessed price to maintain control. SBTs could be used to create more nuanced versions of SALSA—for example, where rights of participation are approved by the community to minimize strategic behavior from within or outside the community.
  • Experiments in democratic mechanism design such as quadratic voting. Holders of SBTs representing membership in a community could quadratically vote on parameters such as incentives and tax rates. Ultimately, “markets” and “politics” are not separate design spaces; SBTs can be a major part of a technological stack that enables the entire space between the two categories to be explored. Provision of public goods through quadratic funding is another such intersection.

Of course, there are dystopian scenarios to consider. Immigration systems could be permissioned with migratory SBTs. Regulatory capture could be codified in nested community tokens, where homeowners have a disproportionate voting power and stall housing construction. SBTs could automate red-lining. As we discuss further below, these scenarios should be considered within the context of the current opaque-top-down permissions and discriminations. SBTs make discrimination more transparent and therefore potentially contestable.

DAO 通常在虚拟世界和物理世界中拥有或围绕拥有资产进行组织。到目前为止，web3 的范围主要局限于一小类财产，其权利捆绑可以完全转让：代币、NFT、艺术品、第一版或像美国宪法这样的稀有手稿。但是，对可转让性的强调对 web3 不利，使其无法代表和支持当今一些最简单且无处不在的财产合同，例如公寓租赁。财产权在罗马法律传统中被定义为使用权（“usus”）、消费或破坏权（“abusus”）和利润（“fructus”）的组合。很少有所有这些权利共同归属于同一所有者。例如，公寓租赁授予出租人有限的使用权（“usus”），但不授予出租人摧毁公寓（“abusus”）、出售（“fructus”）甚至转让使用权（转租）的不受限制的权利.不动产（土地）的权利通常受到一系列私人使用限制、公共使用权授予、销售权限制，甚至征用权购买权的限制。他们通常还背负着将一些财务价值转移给贷方的抵押贷款。

财产创新的未来不太可能建立在迄今为止想象的 web3 完全可转让的私有财产之上。相反，创新将取决于分解财产权以匹配现有财产制度特征的能力，并编写更丰富的细节。公司和其他组织形式的演变恰恰是为了以更具创造性的方式重新配置产权——例如，授予员工使用专有设施（“usus”）的权限，但保留经理更改或损坏资产的权利（“abusus”），同时支付股东最大的经济利益（“结果”）。 SBT 可以灵活地代表和扩大物理和虚拟资产的细微产权，同时鼓励新的实验。这里只是一些用例：

  • 允许访问私人或公共控制的资源（例如，住宅、汽车、博物馆、公园和虚拟等价物）。可转让的 NFT 未能很好地捕捉到这个用例，因为访问权限通常是有条件的且不可转让的：如果我相信你会进入我的后院并将其用作娱乐空间，这并不意味着我相信你会将该许可转授给其他人。
  • SBT 授予研究人员数据访问权限的数据合作社，同时赋予成员授予访问权限的权利（可能通过二次投票），并就研究产生的发现和知识产权的经济权利进行谈判。我们将在第 4 节“复数意义构建”中进一步探讨这一点。
  • 试验当地货币的规则，让居住在特定地区或属于特定社区的灵魂更有价值地持有和消费。
  • 参与实验，其中 SBT 为较少情境化的灵魂（例如移民、青少年）在新颖和更广泛的网络中获得影响力创造持续的基础。这样的灵魂将从狭窄的 SBT 开始，将他们与家人或当地社区集中在一起。随着他们的从属关系逐渐多样化，他们将获得更广泛的 SBT，以实例化投票权以影响更广泛的网络——本着 Danielle Allen 的多元政治理念的精神——这一过程目前由任意年龄和居住地截止进行调解。
  • 市场设计实验，例如 Harberger 税收和 SALSA（在拍卖中出售的自我评估许可证），资产持有人发布自我评估价格，任何其他人都可以从他们那里购买资产，并且必须定期缴纳税款与自我评估的价格成正比，以保持控制。 SBT 可用于创建更细微的 SALSA 版本——例如，社区批准参与权，以尽量减少来自社区内部或外部的战略行为。
  • 二次投票等民主机制设计实验。代表社区成员的 SBT 持有者可以对激励和税率等参数进行二次投票。归根结底，“市场”和“政治”不是独立的设计空间。 SBT 可以成为技术堆栈的主要部分，可以探索两个类别之间的整个空间。通过二次融资提供公共产品是另一个这样的交叉点。

当然，还有一些反乌托邦场景需要考虑。移民系统可以通过迁移 SBT 获得许可。 监管捕获可以编码在嵌套的社区代币中，其中房主拥有不成比例的投票权并阻碍住房建设。SBT 可以使红线自动化。 正如我们在下面进一步讨论的那样，应该在当前不透明的自上而下的权限和歧视的背景下考虑这些场景。 SBT 使歧视更加透明，因此可能具有争议性。

4.8 From Private and Public Goods to Plural Network Goods

从私人和公共产品到多元网络产品

§5 PLURAL SENSEMAKING

An example of plural network goods that are of increasing salience in a digital world are predictive models built off user data. Both artificial intelligence (AI) and prediction markets seek to predict future events based on data primarily elicited from people. But both paradigms are limited in different and nearly opposite ways. The dominant paradigm in AI eschews incentives, instead hoovering up (public or privately surveilled) data feeds and synthesizing them into predictions through proprietary large-scale, non-linear models—harnessing the default web2 monopoly on “usus” without any “fructus” flowing to data laborers. Prediction markets take the opposite approach, where people bet on outcome in the hopes of financial gains, relying entirely on economic incentives of financial speculation (“fructus”) without synthesizing the beliefs of bettors to produce composable models. At the same time, both of these paradigms yield conclusions that are characterized as “objective” truths; whereas AI models are portrayed as “universal” or “generally intelligent,” prediction markets are portrayed as summarizing all the beliefs of the market participants in a single number: equilibrium price.

A more productive paradigm is to eschew these extremes, and instead draw on the virtues of both, while compensating for their weaknesses and enriching their breadth. We propose thoughtfully combining the complexity of non-linear AI models with the market incentives of prediction markets to transform passive data laborers into active data creators. With such provenance-rich information rooted in the sociality of data creators, we illustrate how DeSoc can unlock plural network(ed) intelligence more powerful than either approach.

5.1 Prediction Markets to Prediction Plurality

5.2 Artificial Intelligence to Plural Intelligence

5.3 Programmable Plural Privacy

在数字世界中越来越显着的多种网络商品的一个例子是基于用户数据构建的预测模型。人工智能 (AI) 和预测市场都试图根据主要从人们那里获得的数据来预测未来事件。但是这两种范式都以不同且几乎相反的方式受到限制。 AI 中的主导范式避开了激励措施，而是收集（公共或私人监视的）数据馈送，并通过专有的大规模非线性模型将它们综合成预测——利用默认的 web2 对“usus”的垄断，而没有任何“fructus”流动给数据工作者。预测市场采取相反的方法，人们在结果上下注，希望获得经济收益，完全依赖金融投机（“水果”）的经济激励，而不综合投注者的信念来产生可组合的模型。同时，这两种范式都得出了被称为“客观”真理的结论。人工智能模型被描述为“通用”或“普遍智能”，而预测市场被描述为将市场参与者的所有信念总结为一个数字：均衡价格。

一个更有成效的范式是避开这些极端，取而代之的是利用两者的优点，同时弥补它们的弱点并丰富它们的广度。我们建议将非线性 AI 模型的复杂性与预测市场的市场激励相结合，将被动的数据劳动者转变为主动的数据创造者。有了这些植根于数据创建者的社交性的来源丰富的信息，我们说明了 DeSoc 如何能够解锁比任何一种方法都更强大的多元网络智能。

5.1 预测复数的预测市场

5.2 人工智能到多元智能

5.3 可编程复数隐私